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Abstract 
 
An emerging area of study has begun to look at the perceptions of justice of the 
family and friends of crime victims – or, secondary victims.  It is important to improve 
understanding of secondary victims’ experiences of justice, partly because knowledge 
about how they perceive justice may help forensic psychologists assist them more 
effectively.  This research attempted to assess how well existing justice theories could 
account for secondary victims’ perceptions of justice, and also help determine what is 
important to them.  Using the largely ignored group of secondary victims of non-sexual 
violent crime, the research consisted of two interrelated stages.  In Stage One, 
qualitative analysis was used to determine the justice perceptions of 22 secondary 
victims.  The findings revealed that a combination of principles from various theories of 
justice were present in secondary victims’ views.  However, participants also endorsed 
unique aspects of victimisation that did not link directly to existing theories.  
Importantly, many participants made primary victim and offender outcome comparisons 
using seven variables.  Three related to the primary victim and four related to the 
offender.  A second stage of research involved 156 potential secondary victim 
participants drawn from the community.  They responded to a scenario involving a 
victim of crime, in order to determine whether they considered the same seven variables 
identified in Stage One in deciding whether justice had been achieved for that victim.  
The results showed that participants considered these variables when making 
comparisons of outcomes, and did so irrespective of whether they felt justice had been 
achieved in the given scenario.  Overall, the findings of the two stages of this research 
represented an important step towards a more comprehensive understanding of the 
justice experiences and perceptions of secondary victims of violent crime, and therefore 
have important implications for forensic psychologists working with this group.
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Theoretical Overview 
 
Broadly speaking, justice is a fundamental concept in human interactions.  Some 
believe that the sense of justice gives people certainty in an uncertain world (e.g., van 
den Bos, 2001), and that the promise of justice is needed by people to trust others and to 
trust authorities (van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998).  Kelsen (1957) believed that 
justice was important because it related to conflicts of interest; where there was discord, 
disagreement and discontent, justice mechanisms could provide regulation.  In any 
event, many agree that justice perceptions have an influence at the individual, group and 
societal level (Kazemi & Tornblom, 2008).  However, psychological investigation into 
peoples’ perceptions of justice is comparatively recent, with specific inquiries into the 
sense of justice experienced in everyday life largely beginning during World War Two 
(Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams, 1949).   
Research into such perceptions is relevant to forensic psychology for two main 
reasons: because people need to be motivated to voluntarily obey the law in order for 
society to function effectively, and because the judicial process has the capacity to be 
psychologically positive for the individuals involved in it.  
Regarding the first reason, the law is heavily dependent on voluntary 
compliance, and for the law to be effective it stands to reason that people must not only 
obey it, but also maintain a desire and compulsion to do so (Robinson & Darley, 1995).  
In addition, the decision to obey the law must be a voluntary one, because of the 
practical and constitutional limits of the coercive power of legal authorities (Tyler, 
1990).  Indeed, research shows that crime victims are more likely to cooperate with the 
criminal justice system if they are satisfied they have achieved justice through engaging 
in it (Tyler & Huo, 2002).  For example, they are more likely to report crimes in the 
future (Ruback, Cares & Hoskins, 2008).  Kelly (1984) went as far as to say that if the 
disadvantages of participating in the criminal justice system outweighed the advantages, 
more crimes could be committed with impunity.  Voluntary compliance with the 
criminal justice system is also important because the acceptance of judicial decisions is 
a central assumption of democracy.  It has even been argued that to a degree this 
acceptance is a fundamental aspect of the democratic process, because justice, as 
defined by legislation, partly develops from the needs and values of people who bring 
their problems to the legal system (Tyler, 1990).  This highlights the importance of 
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taking into account a wider scope of the impact of the criminal justice system on 
individual attitudes and perceptions of justice. 
Regarding the second reason, research shows that if victims perceive justice has 
been achieved in their circumstance, the judicial process has the capacity to be 
psychologically positive for their recovery from the effects of crime (Kelly, 1984)1.  
Specifically in the case of victimisation from violent crime, these effects can be 
substantial.  Much research in this area has shown that such crime can have a significant 
physical (e.g., Robinson & Keithley, 2000) and financial impact on victims, as well as 
their families (e.g., Cohen, Miller & Rossman, 1994).  Often, the aftermath of violent 
crime can have a negative impact on victims’ social attitudes, resulting in increased fear 
and self-limiting behaviour (e.g., Dull & Wint, 1997; Kilpartick, Seymour and Boyle, 
1991) as well as impacting negative on mental health (Kazantzis, Flett, Long, 
MacDonald, Millar & Clark, 2010).  Despite reforms in the area of victims’ rights, 
which have attempted to make the experience of the justice system more positive for 
crime victims, many may still find the judicial process counterproductive to their 
psychological well-being (Schneider, 2001).  As Herman (2005) explained, this is 
because the subjective wishes and needs of victims are often diametrically opposed to 
the objective requirements of legal proceedings.  For example, while victims need social 
acknowledgement and support, their credibility is often publicly challenged by the 
judicial system.  Similarly, the disempowering nature of many courts is frequently at 
odds with the requirement for victims to re-establish a sense of power and control 
(Herman, 2005). 
Importantly, research shows that it is not just directly victimised people whose 
perception of justice is of interest to psychology (e.g., Davis, Taylor & Bench, 1995; 
Remer & Ferguson, 1995; Sprang, McNeil & Wright, 1989).  Comparatively recently, 
an emerging area of study has begun to look at the second tier of individuals between 
primary victims and society as a whole – or, secondary victims – in an effort to 
elucidate victimisation concerns in a broader sense.  Research suggests that secondary 
victimisation face a range of ego-oriented and primary victim-oriented experiences that 
make them an important subset of the population to study.  Nevertheless, the majority of 
what is currently known about the justice perceptions of secondary victims of non-
sexual violent crime is what can be inferred from existing justice theory literature. 
                                                          
1
 This would be echoed later by Wexler (1992) and his work on therapeutic jurisprudence. 
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Overall, there is clearly a need for investigation into the experiences of 
secondary victims of violent crime as they specifically relate to perceptions of justice.  
As previously noted, such investigation is necessary not only because legal decisions 
and policies can be influenced by secondary victims’ views, but also because it will 
inform how forensic psychology can best respond to their needs.  Specifically, 
knowledge about how they perceive justice can help those who work with them in their 
recovery from victimisation, and help tailor interventions to meet their particular 
requirements.  It is therefore important for forensic psychologists to understand the 
processes and elements of their justice perceptions.  However, no research has thus far 
attempted to determine what secondary victims’ perceptions are and how well 
traditional theories of justice can account for them. 
This research attempted to elucidate the justice perceptions of secondary victims 
of crime, focussing on the largely ignored sub-population of those people whose family 
and friends had experienced non-sexual violent crime.  This was done in order to 
provide a comprehensive picture of their experience and determine to what degree the 
main existing theories of justice (Distributive Justice, Retributive Justice, Procedural 
Justice and Restorative Justice) could account for them.  The project consisted of two 
interrelated stages of research.  
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STAGE ONE 
Introduction 
 
Secondary victimisation 
 
Remer and Ferguson (1995) explain that secondary victimisation occurs when 
the psychological damage suffered by the direct victims of crime is experienced to some 
degree by that person’s significant others.  They are known as secondary victims not 
because they are affected to a lesser degree by it, but because of their indirect 
relationship to the crime and that they can experience a secondary effect from the 
impact on the primary victim.  In outlining characteristics of secondary victims of 
sexual assault, Remer and Elliott (1988a) described three categories of this type of 
victim: men and women in conjoint relationships with the primary victim, such as 
spouses and close friends; children of the primary victim; and extended family members 
of the primary victim.  They suggested that all secondary victims are altered by the 
primary victim’s trauma, whether or not they are consciously aware of it, because usual 
patterns of interaction and behaviour are markedly changed. 
Gaining an understanding of secondary victims’ perceptions of justice is 
important for two main reasons: Firstly, secondary victims can help shape justice 
decisions and policies, and therefore their views can at least partly determine how the 
law responds to their needs.  Secondly, knowledge about how they perceive justice may 
help forensic psychologists to mitigate the breadth and depth of adverse psychological 
consequences on them.  These reasons will be further elucidated below. 
As noted earlier, the perception by secondary victims that justice has been done 
is important because such people make up a segment of the individuals whose concerns 
help define justice – at least in a legal sense (Tyler, 1990).  In practical terms, as 
members of the wider public who have been affected by the decisions of the criminal 
justice system, secondary victims form part of the community that has the power to 
affect judicial decisions, and to encourage changes in justice policies such as the 
sentencing of offenders.  For example, in March 2002, a West Australian sex offender 
was sentenced on appeal to an additional six years of imprisonment for offences 
committed against a number of children (R v Hough, 2002).  The impetus for this 
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appeal was largely the result of the mother of one of the children conducting a well-
documented public campaign against the offender’s original sentence.   
Additionally, as Sprang, McNeil and Wright (1989) explained, secondary 
victimisation by definition suggests that individuals closely connected with the primary 
victim of an offence can suffer some of the same distress as that person.  By virtue of 
this fact, the consequent psychological harm of offences is multiplied.  However, 
Sprang, McNeil and Wright (1989) also outlined that secondary victims’ experiences 
are distinct from those of primary victims.  It is therefore important for therapists 
working with secondary victims to better understand whether they have a unique 
perception of justice, and how they conceptualise it in order to gain insight into the most 
effective responses to the adverse emotional and psychological experiences they are 
subjected to. 
Furthermore, the experiences of secondary victims of non-sexual violent crime 
are clearly different from those of people whose loved ones have been a victim of 
illness, suicide or accidental death (Rando, 1996), and this alone suggests that their 
perceptions can add something unique to the body of related psychological knowledge.  
While secondary victims of non-sexual violent crime must deal with many of the same 
experiences as primary victims, such as emotional management, grief, and post-
traumatic stress, they may also have to consider concerns such as those relating to 
socio-legal factors (Burgess, 1975).  As they specifically relate to secondary victims, 
this includes factors such as their particular experience of the court process and the 
attribution of blame.  As Armour (2002) explained, secondary victims of non-sexual 
violent crime experience loss uniquely for several reasons.  Firstly, they are forced to 
deal with the aftermath of a wilful, unanticipated violent act perpetrated by another.  
Secondly, they may be portrayed – possibly negatively – in the media, and their right to 
privacy invaded as a result of this portrayal.  They may also risk being viewed 
negatively by society in general, and become stigmatised as a result of their 
circumstances.  Thirdly, secondary victims’ needs for justice may be subsumed by those 
of the State, because meeting their needs may not be a priority of the criminal justice 
process.  These unique experiences can combine to create a scenario whereby 
individuals are deeply affected, and they can find that “systems of meaning that 
previously helped them to survive an unpredictable world are suddenly obsolete” 
(Armour, 2002, p. 112).  These matters have implications for how people in helping 
professions assist secondary victims, because knowledge about such factors can 
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encourage the implementation of tailored psychological interventions that take account 
of the specific challenges they face. 
While there are numerous studies that have investigated the perceptions of 
justice of directly victimised individuals (e.g., Kaukinen & Colavecchia, 1999; Kelly, 
1984; Shapland, 1984; Umbreit, 1989), there are comparatively fewer that have looked 
at the perceptions of justice of secondary victims.  There has been some investigation 
into the justice experiences of people in secondary roles (e.g., Sheppard, Saunders & 
Minton, 1988; Skarlicki, Ellard & Kelln, 1998), but they have often been considered as 
either detached observers or active dispute resolvers.  In contrast, there seems to be a 
paucity of research which has specifically addressed the role of actively involved third 
parties.  Additionally, what limited current research exists in the area of secondary 
victimisation has mainly focused on the effects of sexual offences (e.g., Ahrens & 
Campbell, 2000; Balakrishna, 1998; Cooney, Allan, Allan, McKillop & Drake, 2011; 
McCourt, Peel, & O’Carroll, 1998).  In comparison, there is minimal specific 
understanding of what leads secondary victims of non-sexual violent crime to perceive 
that justice has been achieved in their individual circumstance, and the analysis of these 
perceptions is a surprisingly under-researched area of interest to forensic psychology. 
 
Research on Secondary Victims of Non-Sexual Violent Crime 
 
  One of the first studies on secondary victims of non-sexual2 violent crime was 
conducted by Burgess (1975).  Using a qualitative methodology, she interviewed 
secondary victims from nine cases of homicide, and outlined a two-phase homicide-
trauma syndrome for secondary victims as a result.  In the initial phase, immediate 
thoughts were present which consisted of ego-oriented factors such as dealing with 
personal loss, and victim-oriented thoughts such as expressing horror at the way in 
which their loved one died.  The secondary phase consisted of questions asked by the 
significant others.  These were centred on who committed the act, what the family felt 
they must do in the wake of the loss, and how they believed they would go forward 
without their family member.  Burgess (1975) proposed that, in the second phase of the 
syndrome, reactions over time were reorganised.  Here, the family focussed on 
psychological concerns such as grief work and post-traumatic stress. 
                                                          
2
 The focus of this thesis is secondary victims of non-sexual violent crime, as a concurrent research 
project (Downe, 2007) investigated secondary victims of sexual crime.  For brevity, this population group 
will be referred to as secondary victims of violent crime from this point onward. 
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Peach and Klass (1987) also looked at the effects of homicide on the victim’s 
parents.  They observed participants of a support group for secondary victims of child 
homicide for one year and made several important conclusions about secondary victims’ 
needs.  Firstly, they experienced an overwhelming anger and drive for revenge3.  
Secondly, participants were unable to resolve their grief until the legal process had been 
completed.  Next, the secondary victims became fearful for themselves and for their 
other children, and lastly, they experienced that being the parent of a murdered child 
was a taboo role in society. 
In their investigation of the impact of crime on secondary victims, Amick-
McMullan, Kilpatrick, Veronen and Smith (1989) investigated the experiences of 
family and friends of homicide victims.  In doing so, they conceptualised participants’ 
reactions in accordance with classical learning theory.  They believed that being told of 
the murder of a loved one would produce an unconditioned stress response, and then 
previously neutral stimuli would become associated with the traumatic event.  Such 
people might then subsequently demonstrate learned responses similar to the initial 
stress reaction at some future point.  They suggested that the generalisation of aversive 
stimuli could account for the chronic nature of reactions of secondary victims of 
homicide.  The authors further stated that, when associated with avoidance behaviours, 
these reactions were maintained.  As such, they hypothesised that secondary victims 
would experience lasting intrusive cognitions and aversive emotions, as well as 
demonstrating avoidance behaviours.  To test these hypotheses, they evaluated nineteen 
secondary victims of homicide to determine demographic information, their degree of 
psychological adjustment, and their perceptions of the justice system.  Using a symptom 
checklist to determine psychological symptomatology as well as a measure of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), it was found that sixty-four percent of participants 
met criteria of psychopathology sufficient to warrant further assessment and treatment, 
and all demonstrated a persistent degree of PTSD symptoms.  Furthermore, almost half 
of the people surveyed were dissatisfied with the criminal justice system.  This 
antipathy was significantly related to greater psychological symptomatology. 
Further research in this area was conducted by Davis, Taylor and Bench (1995).  
They investigated the impact of rape and other violent crimes on secondary victims, as a 
function of crime type, relationship to the victim, and distress that the victim was 
                                                          
3
 Although there is the possibility of a self-selection bias, because these participants were secondary 
victims of crime that were motivated to form a support group, similar responses have also been found in 
randomised community-based secondary victim research (e.g. Murphy et al., 1999).   
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experiencing.  After recruiting 138 significant others of women who had accessed 
victim support services, they administered several self-report inventories to them in 
order to evaluate their experiences.  Based on existing research at that time (e.g., Norris 
& Kaniasty, 1991), the authors expected to find that the significant others of sexual 
assault victims would exhibit comparatively more distress than significant others of 
non-sexual assault victims.  It was also thought that romantic partners would suffer 
more than family or friends.  In addition, they hypothesised that as the level of 
secondary victims’ distress increased, their ability to assist the primary victim would 
decrease.  Generally, they expected to see a positively correlated relationship between 
primary victims’ and secondary victims’ distress. However, it was discovered that the 
level of victim distress did not foster a significant increase in the reported existing 
distress of their significant others, and that there was no measurable difference between 
the levels of distress of sexual assault victims and non-sexual cases.  In addition, the 
greatest distress was reported by female family and friends of primary victims, 
suggesting a specific gender or relationship effect in this area.  Furthermore, although 
high levels of significant other distress did not appear to interfere with their ability to 
lend support, there was nevertheless evidence of a decrease in their supportive 
behaviour toward the primary victim as their own distress increased. 
In summary, secondary victims of violent crime deal with both their own and 
primary victim concerns.  They can experience anger, post-traumatic stress and a drive 
for revenge as a result of their victimisation, as well as residual intrusive cognitions and 
aversive emotions such as anxiety.  Furthermore, the distress of secondary victims may 
be independent of the distress of the primary victim, and their response to victimisation 
may be related to gender.  Their distress may also cause their supportive behaviour 
towards the primary victim to be reduced.  Additionally, if secondary victims of violent 
crime are dissatisfied with their experience of the justice system their psychological 
symptomatology appears to be exacerbated.   
Despite the fact that these studies on secondary victims have helped elucidate 
their experience of victimisation to some degree, there is little research that has 
specifically investigated their experience and perceptions of justice.  This thesis is an 
attempt to address this deficit of knowledge.  Currently, the vast majority of what is 
known about the justice perceptions of secondary victims of violent crime is what can 
be inferred from existing justice theory literature.  Additionally, despite the 
comprehensiveness of these theories, the frequent controversy of legal outcomes 
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(Gibson, Wilson, Meagher, Denemark & Western, 2004; Kaukinen & Colavecchia, 
1999; Victorian Department of Justice, 2011) reflects not just the varied aims and 
experiences of concerned parties, but also the uniqueness of their perceptions of justice 
as well. 
 
Theories of Justice and their Relationship to Secondary Victims 
 
Four main theories have been developed to explain generally how people 
perceive and experience justice – distributive, retributive, procedural, and restorative 
justice.  These theories represent the bulk of justice conceptualisations in psychology, 
and have been developed and refined over time.  Therefore, an assessment of the 
development of the individual justice theories, their current status and specific relevance 
to secondary victims of violent crime will be provided in the following sections. 
 
Distributive Justice  
 
Distributive justice, a term first coined by the sociologist G. C. Homans (1961), 
broadly refers to the fairness of outcomes (Reithel, Baltes, & Buddhavarapu, 2007).  It 
is a concept that appears to have originated as a result of research conducted into morale 
in the United States armed forces.  A comprehensive research project by Stouffer and 
his colleagues (Stouffer, et al., 1949) was conducted at the request of the United States 
Army in order to assess the attitudes of their soldiers.  Being the first genuinely 
systematic application of social scientific methodology to investigate people’s views on 
the fairness of outcomes, the study produced findings that demonstrated that individuals 
appeared to compare themselves to others when making determinations of personal loss 
or gain.  For example, United States Air Force recruits, for whom promotion was more 
likely, complained more about advancement than their much less promoted military 
police counterparts.  The authors suggested that it was because those in the Air Force 
more regularly received promotions, that they were therefore more readily aggrieved 
when they did not.  Comparatively, those in the Military Police, who were not 
accustomed to the same opportunities, did not feel as deprived by missing out on 
promotion.  It was apparent that individuals that were used to a particular set of 
circumstances compared themselves relative to these circumstances, as opposed to the 
circumstances of others in a different situation.  This concept, known as relative 
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deprivation (Stouffer, et al., 1949), strongly suggests evidence for a comparative and 
contextual view of justice, and highlights that justice cannot be conceptualised in 
isolation from the experience of it. 
 
 
Relative Deprivation 
 
Over the next 25 years, research on relative deprivation flourished, and further 
evidence for a comparative and contextual view of justice was found.  Using examples 
from the extensive World War Two study, Davis (1959) was the first to outline a theory 
of relative deprivation pertaining to intergroup relations.  He postulated that three 
conditions were necessary for a sense of relative deprivation.  Firstly, an individual had 
to not possess the condition in question.  Secondly, that person had to want such a 
condition.  Lastly, they must also have felt entitled to it.  As he explained, people 
generally only compare themselves with others who are similar to them, and thus will 
automatically feel entitled in such circumstances.  Runciman (1966) concurred with 
these preconditions, but introduced the additional concept of feasibility.  He believed it 
was the perception of the condition as attainable that was a crucial factor, and suggested 
that people will “seldom feel relatively deprived by reference to members of more 
fortunate groups" (Runciman, 1966, p. 27).  This is because they will typically view 
their attainability of similar conditions as unfeasible.  This suggests that people are 
resigned to their circumstances in the face of injustice, which presents as a somewhat 
pessimistic view.  In the specific context of secondary victimisation, this implies that 
people who experience such victimisation will then be actively motivated to seek a just 
outcome, particularly if they see others in their position achieving justice.  Additionally, 
they must hold the view that they are entitled to this outcome, and believe it can be 
attained. 
Subsequently, a model of relative deprivation as it pertained to the individual 
was first presented by Crosby (1976).  Attempting to outline the necessary 
preconditions that instigated the concept, she specified five requirements that were 
essential for an individual to feel aggrieved.  Firstly, a person must be aware that 
another has a desired goal, in order for his or her own situation to be analysed in respect 
to it.  Secondly, the person must desire this goal in order for the emotional aspect to 
become relevant.  Thirdly, a sense of entitlement must exist in order for relative 
deprivation to occur.  This pertains to the individual possessing a feeling of deserving 
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the goal because it is right and fair that they achieve it, rather than simply that they long 
for it.  Fourthly, as Runciman (1966) understood, the wanted goal must be seen to be 
achievable, and if it is not, then feelings of relative deprivation are unlikely.  Lastly, and 
related to the sense of entitlement, the person must not blame themselves for not having 
that which they desire.  In other words, that they feel they do not deserve it, or that it is 
fair that they are without it.  Using this framework, a secondary victim’s sense of justice 
would be established if they sought – and subsequently attained – a particular 
achievable outcome that they had witnessed someone else receiving (and that they felt 
they were entitled to).  This has particular relevance to criminal justice; Crosby’s (1976) 
model suggests that for secondary victims to feel that justice has been achieved in their 
circumstance, they must have an emotional connection to it, feel they deserve it as much 
as everyone else, actively seek to achieve it and subsequently do so.  Any alternative to 
these criteria must therefore result in a sense of injustice. 
Although models of relative deprivation such as Crosby’s (1976) were able to be 
empirically validated (e.g., Alain, 1985), the construct fell into disfavour by the 1980s, 
mainly through criticism by resource mobilisation theory proponents (Walker & Smith, 
2002).  This theory holds that there is always discontent between what outcomes people 
perceive each other to have, but it is only when concrete resources are available that 
change is actioned (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).  An additional criticism was that only 
restricted ranges of emotion were typically examined in relative deprivation studies.  
For example, emotions including anger and frustration were often considered, but 
contribution of other emotions such as hope and faith were frequently ignored (Taylor 
& Moghaddam, 1994).   Despite these concerns, relative deprivation gained interest 
again in the 1990s, and is currently used to help explain numerous paradoxical reactions 
people have to their circumstances based on their subjective comparisons to others.  For 
example, the concept has been integrated into theories such as social identity theory and 
social comparison theory (Walker & Smith, 2002).  Researchers have also elaborated on 
the distinction between feeling deprived as an individual, as a group member and a 
deprivation experienced on behalf of others.  This last area is of particular relevance to 
secondary victimisation research, because it refers to the feeling of discontent one 
experiences when perceiving that members of another group have been unfairly treated.  
Studies in this area show that relative deprivation on behalf of others is felt by those 
who are concerned about social inequality and translates into attitudes and behaviours 
aimed at helping others (Tougas & Beaton, 2002). 
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Nevertheless, the concept of relative deprivation appears hard to predict, and 
studies of it have no clear way of determining the target of social comparison to which 
the individual measures themselves.  In the context of criminal justice, this may concern 
a secondary victim looking to the criminal justice system to create a successful 
resolution to their concerns in the same way that others may have achieved it before 
them.  However, the key issue may be then whether they feel such a successful 
resolution is possible, depending on their opinion of the justice system.  This highlights 
the importance of addressing perceptions of justice, and seems to reiterate that justice – 
at least in the criminal justice arena – is a highly personalised, dynamic and context-
specific concept. 
 
Equity Theory 
 
After the initial interest in relative deprivation theory, the next wave of 
distributive justice theory research began to look at individuals' understanding of justice 
in the context of decisions about their efforts in comparison with others.  A key 
development at this time was Adams' (1965) work on equity theory.  This theory 
focuses on relationships between people, and states that people judge outcomes as fair 
when the ratio of their own inputs and outputs is perceived to equal the ratio of the 
inputs and outputs of others.  Additionally, an important part of equity theory is 
concerned with what people think is fair and equitable, and how they respond when they 
receive far more or less than they believe they deserve.  Inputs are said to be the 
contributions that are made by the individual or the group, and can include attributes, 
abilities or efforts.  Outcomes are the rewards of those inputs, and can be tangible or 
intangible.  For example, a tangible outcome could be financial remuneration, and an 
intangible outcome the status that comes with such remuneration.  The most important 
aspect to consider in equity theory is that, for justice to exist, the ratio of outcomes to 
inputs must be perceived to be equal in a relationship, rather than the outcomes 
themselves.  In other words, the more a person invests into a relationship, the more they 
should receive within that relationship, and it is psychologically uncomfortable to 
receive more (or less) than one has put in to a particular situation. 
Essentially, Adams’ (1965) work produced different conclusions than those of 
early relative deprivation studies.  Rather than seeing the emotional responses of 
aggrieved individuals resulting directly from perceived relative deprivation, he believed 
that they were a result of acutely felt injustice.  Thus, he proposed a theory of social 
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inequity, in an attempt to address the inability to predict actions people would take to 
actively deal with a perceived inequality.  Relying on Festinger’s (1957) theory of 
cognitive dissonance to explain the mental processes involved in perceived inequality, 
Adams (1965) suggested that people strive for justice in their interactions with others, 
and become distressed when an injustice is perceived.  This psychological discomfort 
then leads them to correct the perceived imbalance, and this can be done in one of two 
ways.  Firstly, a person can restore the inequality itself, therefore changing the actual 
input and output ratios in the relationships to make them equal.  Secondly, 
psychological restoration can occur, whereby the perception of the ratios can be 
cognitively distorted to make them appear equal.  This can take the form of mechanisms 
such as justifications or subjective appraisals.  Either way, perceived inequality can 
motivate a person to manipulate elements in the equity equation to order to seek justice 
as they understood it.  Providing an example specific to secondary victims, Amick-
McMullan and her colleagues (1989) suggested that the strong link that they found 
between psychological adjustment after victimisation and satisfaction with the criminal 
justice system indicated the relevance of equity theory in understanding post-traumatic 
responses.  Specifically, they purported that if secondary victims viewed the justice 
system as an agent of equity, then the negative correlation they found between distress 
and satisfaction with it could be predicted.  However, equity theory has been criticised 
on a number of fronts, including its non-specificity, cultural bias, and the ambiguity of 
processes involved (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).  Firstly, equity theorists have little 
ability to specify exactly what the appropriate inputs and outcomes might be in any 
given circumstances, and any results discovered can be explained retrospectively 
through seeking confirmatory information.  Secondly, the theory was conceived within 
a North American context, and using solely work-related circumstances.  Therefore, it 
will tend to reflect these limitations, and be restricted in its capacity to offer more 
general explanations of human behaviour.  Lastly, equity theorists seem to be vague 
about the process of social comparison that is at the heart of their understanding of 
human relations. 
Additionally, an analysis of research in this area reveals that taking the 
emotional element out of the comparison and contextualisation view of justice leads 
researchers to discuss peoples’ responses to inequity in terms of psychological 
discomfort.  This seems to suggest that justice relates solely to the effort expended by 
involved parties.  In this sense, it is not the emotion that drives behaviour, but behaviour 
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– and the perceived behaviour of others – that drives emotions.  It also appears to 
indicate that people who seek justice are in a strong position to achieve it, irrespective 
of their circumstances.  This is because in this model, an individual can presumably 
always correct perceived imbalance, either through action or perception.  However, this 
seems to be at odds with research that indicates helplessness is a primary emotion in 
victims of crime (e.g., Brewin, Andrews & Rose, 2000).  It may be that while someone 
perhaps has the ability to correct perceived injustice, they may not possess the actual 
capacity to do so. 
The use of this theory delivers various challenges when applied to secondary 
victims in the criminal justice arena.  For example, it is not able to be used to explain 
what happens to the secondary victim experiencing psychological discomfort if they are 
not able to correct the perceived imbalance successfully themselves.  If this process of 
restoring balance is taken out of their hands, and the outcome is found wanting, it is 
unclear if they simply employ cognitive distortions of a magnitude sufficient to 
overcome this discomfort.  It is also uncertain what happens if they cannot do so 
successfully. 
 
Social Exchange Theory 
 
Unlike Adams, Homans (1961) suggested that distributive justice was related to 
social exchange, rather than the cognitive dissonance involved in equity theory.  He 
believed that power was a basic notion behind ideas of resource allocation.  Based on 
this idea, Homans stated that when individuals make determinations about justice, they 
are likely to emphasise the worth of characteristics and behaviour in which they are 
themselves most capable.  This occurs after a process whereby people work with others 
to develop group-enforced rules of who should rightfully receive what, and in accepting 
these rules and behaving fairly, they expect others to do the same.  More broadly 
speaking, people will behave appropriately within the boundaries of society’s 
prescriptions and reasonably rely on their peers to reciprocate this courtesy.  Such 
notions have since been criticised as being too focussed on contributions and the final 
value of rewards, and for ignoring the subjective status grounded in such rewards (e.g., 
Jasso, 1980).  Furthermore, this appears to raise a question about what occurs when the 
assumption that others will act fairly – indeed, lawfully – is not met.  As such, it appears 
to explain what mechanisms create particular expectations, but is less able to discuss the 
processes involved when people perceive the response to this expectation is lacking.  
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People who are secondary victims of violent crime have certainly experienced a 
situation whereby their expectation of others to behave appropriately has not been met.  
However, Homans’ (1961) idea of justice, as rooted in social exchange, seems unable to 
fully explain their experience. 
Subsequently, from the cognitive dissonance framework of Adams (1965), and 
the exchange framework of Homans (1961), came the work of Walster, Walster and 
Berscheid (1978).  For these authors, social interactions were concerned with 
individuals appraising their own circumstances, and holding consequent beliefs about 
resource allocation based on these appraisals.  Using the theoretical foundations of both 
Adams and Homans, they attempted to specify circumstances that could create an 
equality of exchange ratios, and were therefore seen by individuals as equitable.  
Comparatively, when situations were interpreted as inequitable, the person who felt 
exploited would experience two main types of psychological distress: retaliation distress 
and self-concept distress. 
Folger and Pugh (2002) explain that retaliation distress refers either to the fear a 
harm-doer has that their victim will restore equity by punishing them, or to the sense the 
victim has that retaliation is expected of them.  In criminal justice terms, the perpetrator 
of a crime may experience such distress by anticipating a revenge act by the primary 
victim’s friends and family.  Alternatively, the secondary victim may feel pressure to 
seek revenge for the crime themselves, either through legal means (for example, alerting 
police to the crime), or independent of them (by seeking direct action against the 
offender).  Conversely, the other type of psychological distress suggested by Walster, 
Walster and Berscheid (1978), self-concept distress, refers more specifically to 
cognitive dissonance in that it is an internal conflict resulting from contradiction of 
accepted ethical principles.  As Schafer, Keith and Lorenz (1984) explain, being over-
benefitted in an exchange relationship creates self-concept distress because it can 
violate an individual’s self-expectations of their own fairness.  On the other hand, being 
under-benefitted in a relationship can also create distress in a situation where the 
individual believes they have allowed themselves to be exploited by another.  An 
example in the criminal justice domain might be if the perpetrator of a crime is forced to 
pay compensation to a secondary victim that they personally perceive as inadequate (or 
the payment is made for them by the State), or the secondary victim blames themselves 
for the crime occurring in the first place.    
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Walster, Walster and Berscheid (1978) also suggested that in such instances of 
perceived inequity, steps will be taken by the distressed individual to reduce their 
associated anxiety.  This can include the restoration of actual equity, or the restoration 
of psychological equity through altering perceptions or employing rationalisations.  
Walster and Walster (1975) noted several techniques used by individuals to this end.  
For example, someone who has offended against another may derogate their victim, 
deny responsibility for their behaviour, or minimise the victim’s suffering.  They 
suggested that in some circumstances the victim may even justify their own 
victimisation. 
 
Criticisms of Distributive Justice 
 
While distributive justice appears to have utility in helping to understand justice 
perceptions, it is not without its problems.  Hogan and Emler (1981) provide an 
overview of these.  Firstly, justice viewed in the context of distributions often leads to 
the interpretation of desires in economic benefit terms, and treats individuals’ goals 
simplistically.  These authors argue that perceptions of justice typically involve more 
complex processes and variables than distributive justice principles can account for.  
Secondly, uses of distributive justice principles often involve only system-based 
considerations of resources, at the expense of individual dynamics.  Thirdly, the use of 
distributive justice principles assumes that individuals are in a position to know all 
relevant inputs and outcomes.  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, proponents of this 
type of justice only tend to be concerned with tangible and quantifiable resources, and 
usually minimise the role of abstract concepts such as emotion. 
 
Summary of Distributive Justice 
 
Overall, there is little doubt that the investigations of relative deprivation, equity 
theory, and social exchange theory conducted over the last 50 years or so have been 
instrumental to our understanding of the principles of distributive justice.  These 
principles have provided a useful way of understanding the motivations that secondary 
victims have to strive for perceived fair outcomes in their lives, as well as their 
perceptions of actual outcomes.  In the context of the criminal justice system, such 
outcomes may refer to their perception of legal attempts to restore an approximation of 
the status quo ante by balancing victim and offender outcomes (Wiles & Pease, 2001). 
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In practical terms, this can relate to such things as victim support schemes, the scaling 
of offender penalties in proportion to harm inflicted on victims, and compensation or 
repatriation schemes  
Generally, distributive justice research suggests that secondary victims assess 
their outcomes and compare them to the outcomes of others.  They will feel justice is 
done if they seek, and then successfully attain, what they view as an outcome that they 
are entitled to.  They must also feel that the outcome is achievable, and have witnessed 
someone else receiving it.  Additionally, the ratio of input and outputs, compared to 
others, must be perceived as equitable by secondary victims, otherwise psychological 
discomfort results, and there is a subsequent motivation to change the perceived 
imbalance.  Studies in this area indiciate that secondary victims may also evaluate their 
own inputs as comparatively more favourable in order to explain unbalanced 
distributions.  For example, secondary victims may exaggerate the role of the offender 
in their victimisation (Walster & Walster, 1975). 
More often than not, distributive justice research appears to suggest that 
secondary victims are likely to behave as rational actors when considering experiences 
of justice, and that there are certain criteria which, if met, will allow justice to be 
achieved for anyone.  In this context, despite providing strong evidence for the 
importance of a comparative and contextual view of justice, such research ignores the 
role of emotions and power. 
As noted, an underlying idea within the distributive conceptualisation of justice 
is that if people behave lawfully within society, they expect the same in return from 
others.  Due to the fact that this does not always occur, particularly in the context of the 
criminal justice system, alternative theorists have sought to explain some of the 
psychological dynamics present when there is a significant perceived imbalance.  The 
types of theories addressing these dynamics come under the heading of retributive 
justice. 
 
 
Retributive Justice 
 
Retributive justice is considered the most basic form of justice, and is certainly 
more emotive and much less contingent on cognitions than other types (Sanders & 
Hamilton, 2001). It is a common theme in classical literature, and remains a popular 
sentiment in modern culture.  It is primarily connected to the allocation of blame, and 
sanctions that seek to punish wrongdoing.  It is related to distributive justice in the sense 
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that it highlights the need for recognising and addressing unbalanced outcomes, but 
takes subjective and emotional factors into comparatively greater consideration.  In this 
sense, it is aligned easily with the adversarial law concept of justice, and presents as the 
negative balance to the positive allocations of distributive justice.  The underlying 
principle is that justice is served by the degree, proportionality, and appropriateness of 
punishment allocated to an offender. 
 
Punishment as a Core Retributive Justice Concept 
 
As a core concept of retributive justice, punishment is defined as a negative 
sanction which is intentionally applied to someone who has been perceived to have 
violated a law, a rule, a norm, or an expectation (Miller & Vidmar, 1981).  Two 
important implications of this definition are firstly, that punishment must follow a 
violation and be a direct consequence of it, and secondly, that a sanction can take many 
different forms.  Although restrictive consequences such as custodial sentences or 
community supervision are typical of sanctions in the legal system, in a broader sense 
they can also include social consequences such as ridicule, ostracism, group exclusion 
or even violent retaliation (Miller & Vidmar, 1981).   
Vidmar (2001) analysed the psychological, sociological and philosophical 
writings about retribution, and believed they pointed to a six-stage model of the 
dynamics involved in retributive justice.  Firstly, there is a perceived rule or norm 
violation.  Secondly, the rule violator’s intention is perceived as blameworthy.  Thirdly, 
the combination of the first two stages either harms or threatens to harm values related 
to the perceiver’s personal self, status, or internalised group values.  Fourthly, the 
negative emotion of anger is aroused in response.  Next, the cognitions and aroused 
emotions help develop reactions against the violator, and lastly, the anger dissipates 
during or following punishment as cognitions return to homeostasis the norm is 
vindicated, and control is restored.  This model provides evidence for victims’ sense of 
justice being about resolving a sense of imbalance, particularly highlighted by the 
notion of homeostasis.  As Vidmar (2001) observed, expressions of injustice at stage 
three would typically be articulated in the form of subjective statements of what ‘ought’ 
to be.  Therefore, concerning the last stage of the model, there may be occasions where 
retribution does not produce homeostasis, but rather encourages anger and cognitions of 
harm.  Under these conditions, secondary victims may primarily be motivated to seek 
retribution through utilitarian or non-utilitarian approaches. 
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Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian Approaches 
 
Research by Darley and Pittman (2003) suggests that people seek to punish 
perceived wrongdoers using either a utilitarian or a non-utilitarian approach.  Utilitarian 
approaches include specific and general deterrence, and incapacitation.  Specific 
deterrence is punishment that aims to deter an individual from committing future 
offences.  General deterrence occurs when the greater population is deterred from 
committing future crimes by observing the punishment imposed on others.  
Incapacitation is concerned with preventing crime by incarcerating individuals likely to 
commit future transgressions.  When applied to secondary victims, these 
conceptualisations of justice seem to suggest that some secondary victims would seek 
retributive actions that had the common goal of impacting upon the behaviour of an 
offender or potential offender. 
Conversely, secondary victims taking a non-utilitarian approach would be likely 
to endorse punishment purely as ‘just deserts’ (Darley and Pittman, 2003) – there would 
be no aim to alter the future behaviour of a perceived offender.  This suggests that in 
these circumstances, secondary victims would perceive that justice could be achieved 
independently of any deterrence or improvement on the part of the offender.  If there 
was change brought about in the offender as a result, it would simply be seen as an 
unintended by-product.   
 
Support for Utilitarian and Non-utilitarian Approaches 
 
There is mixed support for utilitarian and non-utilitarian punishment approaches 
in justice research literature.  Some studies clearly suggest that secondary victims would 
be comparatively more interested in pure retribution and less about concepts such as 
deterrence.  For example, Carlsmith (2006) looked at the punishment decisions made by 
a total of 209 university students in three related studies.  He concluded that while 
people say they value utilitarian goals, when required to seek relevant information and 
assign sentences to offenders, they appear to care most about non-utilitarian goals.  For 
example, participants preferred to focus on the magnitude of harm caused by an 
offender and the offender’s intent, rather than deterrence or incapacitation factors. 
In scrutinising existing research, Roberts (1996) concluded both utilitarian and 
non-utilitarian approaches appeared to be endorsed by people equally when considering 
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retributive actions.  This view was supported by Finkel, Maloney, Valbuena and 
Groscup (1996) in a study dealing with the effects of recidivism on punishment 
motives.  They found that while their participants chose to sentence wrongdoers in an 
additive way if they had an existing criminal record, they did not do so to excess, and 
made judgments about retribution largely on proportional offence-to-punishment 
grounds.  Specifically relating this to secondary victims, it highlights the importance of 
looking at justice in the broader context of perceived individual circumstances. 
In further support of the importance of taking contextual factors into account, 
Goldberg, Lerner and Tetlock (1999) found that anger did not lead inevitably to blame, 
punishment and subsequent retribution.  They hypothesised that the relationship 
between anger and punishment depended on the social context of the wrongdoing, and 
found that when participants learned that justice was served to a person after an anger-
eliciting event, their tendency to punish in unrelated situations was largely reduced.  
Graham, Weiner and Zucker (1997) also subscribed to the idea of the individual as an 
active assessor of the controllability and responsibility of the actions of others.  They 
suggested that although utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches shared common 
antecedents in some situations, they should be distinguished as separate alternatives 
derived at by complex individual assessment of specific cases.  Therefore, based on this 
research, a sense of justice – and certainly the motivation to retribution – is presumably 
filtered through a secondary victim’s interpretation of their situation. 
Additionally, Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug and Gabriel (2002) conducted a regression 
analysis of punishment goals using a total of 357 Swiss citizens.  Participants responded 
to a questionnaire consisting of three vignettes portraying crimes of varying seriousness, 
in order for the researchers to measure certain constructs.  These constructs, based on 
sentencing goal literature, included retribution of guilt (meaning the offender should 
suffer proportionally in relation to their guilt), general and specific deterrence, 
rehabilitation, positive prevention and restitution of harm.  Their results suggested a 
two-dimensional structure of what people hoped to achieve when punishing offenders – 
firstly, justice considerations related to the victim’s and society’s needs, and secondly, 
punitive actions against the offender.  These independent constructs accounted for 
ninety-seven percent of variance obtained by the authors.  This seems to suggest further 
that secondary victims may well view justice as being able to achieve balance and 
recognise that specific outcomes are necessary for all interested parties.  This research 
also supports the idea that actual victims, and those acting in the role of victim, choose 
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to punish offenders using combinations of utilitarian and non-utilitarian goals.  They 
appear to do so to meet social, legal and moral functions. 
 
Retribution as a Social Function 
 
It is clear that while most researchers agree that retributive approaches 
essentially deal with notions of revenge, they nevertheless have important social 
functions that could apply to secondary victims.  Frijda (1994) stated that at the societal 
level, vengeance serves to equalise power, and on an individual level it can serve the 
same purpose.  It can reduce the perceived powerlessness and helplessness by re-
establishing superiority of the aggrieved.  This seems to suggest further evidence for the 
importance of looking at justice in the context of the broader society.  Frijda (1994) also 
explained that retribution can encourage the restoration of self-esteem.  In this sense, 
retributive justice may be seen as a prospective way to restore a victim’s self-worth in 
addition to group norms and values, through the impact of the punishment (Feather, 
1998).  These dynamics may also apply to secondary victims. Furthermore, another 
motivation Frijda (1994) outlines is escape from the pain of negative experiences such 
as insult, harm, loss, and humiliation.  This suggests that victims of injustice feel 
compelled by both societal and individual motivations to seek retribution. 
 
Retribution as a Legal Function 
 
In addition to social considerations, retribution also has relevance to secondary 
victims as a legal concept.  In fact, it has long been suggested that criminal law has its 
historical origin as a crude regulation of social control by way of retribution (Pound, 
1930).  For example, in pre-law societies, sacrificing a wrongdoer to a deity was often 
done in order to prevent any wrath being dealt out to the entire community.  These sorts 
of practices subsequently developed as a means of regulating (and intercepting) the 
resulting private war between families as reciprocal actions escalated.  Gradually, with 
the rise of social control through politically organised society, religious misdeeds 
became legal ones, and sacrifice became legal execution.  Thus, criminal law itself 
originated from the process of regulating the occasions and manner of retributions, and 
from outlining formal steps that dealt with them (Parker, 1971). 
Today, these institutionalised mechanisms still serve to satisfy the victim, and 
define boundaries and social values of groups as they did in pre-law society, but they 
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also put constraints on the desire for revenge by the victim (Sanders & Hamilton, 2001).  
However, as Hogan and Emler (1981) explain, this bureaucratisation of retribution only 
covers a small fraction of possible transgressions against individuals, and only the most 
serious ones.  Therefore, it is possible that the appropriateness of a particular 
punishment, as deemed by an institution such as a criminal court, may be incongruent 
with an individual’s idea about what they believe is an appropriate punishment.  So, 
despite evidence that criminal punishments can correspond to societal norms (Rossi & 
Berk, 1997), there is clearly no guarantee that they will correspond to those of the 
primary victim or their significant others.  This clearly has implications for secondary 
victims of violent crime in the event that they perceive legal mechanisms as being 
unable to fulfil their desire for justice.  In the sense that these victims act out of their 
own ideas of what they feel is right or wrong, retribution can also be viewed as a moral 
concept. 
 
Retribution as a Moral Function 
 
 
As Hogan and Emler (1981) outlined, morals are rules that provide a framework 
for normality by establishing ground rules that guide social interactions.  However, they 
also provide criteria for decision-making when specific moral duties conflict, or are 
vague, and tell us what to reasonably expect from others.  While some research has 
suggested that retribution represents a motivation guided primarily by moral principles 
based on strong emotions (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002), McKillop and 
Helmes (2003) suggest that this idea is not supported by public opinion literature.  
These authors explain that the understanding of individuals as emotional beings 
primarily directed by moral outrage is largely unfounded.  Instead, people tend to decide 
punishment goals and punishment severity in a much more measured and complex 
manner.  This view is also supported by researchers such as Doob (2000) and Güth, 
Kliemt and Ockenfels (2001), whose research states that far from a universality of 
retributive responses, a robust variety of concerns appear to exist.  It is also reasonable 
to assume that these concerns apply to secondary victims of violent crime.  In any event, 
the importance of balance appears to be the salient issue.  However, the experience of 
victimisation may dictate that public perceptions of achieving justice through 
appropriate punishment may differ from that of primary and secondary victims. 
In their review of the literature relating to retributive motivations, Darley and 
Pittman (2003) suggested that secondary victims could react to perceived transgressions 
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in such a way that dictated the response to them must typically be proportional to the 
perceived moral gravity of the crime committed.  Furthermore, they believed that the 
moral outrage of society was comparatively greater in response to criminal wrongs (acts 
committed by individuals that are seen as sufficiently grave by society to warrant 
governmental intervention) than civil disagreements.  This has particular relevance to 
secondary victims of violent crime, as it is likely that they could be involved in criminal 
proceedings as a result of their victimisation. 
Specifically, Darley and Pittman’s (2003) review suggested there are two classes 
of retributive action that secondary victims would seek in order to resolve 
transgressions of moral rules and provide a sense of justice: compensation and 
punishment.  Compensation itself is outlined in tort law.  If a breach of one person’s 
conduct causes damage to another, people tend to believe that the person at fault must 
redress that breach.  Therefore, the secondary victim’s goal would be to restore the 
primary victim’s circumstances as closely as possible to what existed before the 
wrongdoing.  This suggests links with the reparative notions of restorative justice, a 
concept which will be discussed in-depth in a later section.  Alternatively, secondary 
victims might choose punishment when compensation by itself is perceived by them to 
be inadequate, and punitive action is required to satisfy the primary victim, or society as 
a whole.  Darley and Pittman (2003) proposed that what mediated these two classes of 
thought were judgments of a perpetrator’s state of mind.  For example, unintentional 
acts were often seen to be appropriate for consideration of compensation, but intentional 
acts, not including those committed under provocation or threat, generally required 
punishment.  In the latter circumstance, they believed that compensation only played a 
secondary role. 
 
Summary of Retributive Justice 
 
Retributive theories suggest that secondary victims may be primarily concerned 
with the allocation of blame, and state that justice is achieved by the degree, 
proportionality and appropriateness of punishment allocated to an offender.  This 
punishment can have the goal of altering the behaviour of the offender, or simply be 
what secondary victims feel should be offenders’ just desserts.  Retributive responses 
can be understood in social, legal and moral terms, all of which appear likely to create a 
distinct drive in secondary victims to redress wrongdoing. 
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Specific to the context of criminal justice, the research tells us that secondary 
victims might seek to achieve justice through punishment goals that are decided in a 
complex and measured way.  Additionally, for a sense of justice to prevail, secondary 
victims may take into account the context of a situation, and tend to allocate what they 
feel are appropriate outcomes – for themselves, the offender, and society. 
Overall, the common theme of retributive justice is that the focus of secondary 
victims is that justice is served purely by the degree and appropriateness of punishment 
on the basis of an offender’s deservedness.  However, the ways in which these 
transgressions are dealt with, and the formal processes by which their consequences are 
decided may also play a crucial role in secondary victims’ sense of justice.  This 
consideration is known by the term ‘procedural justice’. 
 
Procedural Justice 
 
Procedural justice broadly refers to the fairness perceived by involved parties in 
the dispute resolution procedures that they experience. 
 
Early Procedural Justice Research 
 
Early research in the procedural justice arena demonstrated that decision-making 
procedures could affect behaviours and attitudes of people who experienced them.  A 
good example is found in the work of Lewin, Lippitt and White (1939).  They examined 
the way 10-year-olds behaved under different climates of group decision-making 
procedures.  The results showed that while extensive control over the children led to 
more task-oriented behaviour, it fostered more within-group hostility, whereas a 
democratic climate produced a more cohesive and friendly group.  In addition, research 
on communication networks by authors such as Leavitt (1951) and Shaw (1954) 
indicated the importance of individuals’ satisfaction with their ability to communicate 
with other members of a group.  This research echoed what was to become a key and 
reliable finding in procedural justice research – the notion of ‘voice’, or the opportunity 
for someone seeking justice to present information relevant to a decision. 
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The Research of Thibaut and Walker  
 
In their book Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis, Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) consolidated early social psychological literature related to procedures, and 
established ideas on which subsequent research could elaborate.  They asked a number 
of important research questions.  For example, they were interested in what procedures 
could respond to the particular concerns and values of disputants in various social 
settings, and what sorts of variables affected the degree to which participants and 
observers perceived a procedure as ‘just’.  They also considered how various legal 
procedures worked, what their operating procedures produced, and to what degree these 
procedures could be used to apportion justice.  Overall, they attempted to clarify the 
conceptual and theoretical factors underlying debates about legal policy, and how it 
related to people experiencing systems of justice.  This is relevant to the present study, 
as secondary victims of violent crime are likely to come into contact with the formal 
criminal justice system.   
Thibaut and Walker (1975) conducted a total of nine experiments, each looking 
at some aspect of legal procedure and its effect on participants.  From this research, they 
made several important conclusions about what procedures people thought were just.  
Perhaps one of the most crucial was that perceived control over the final decision was 
often a key predictor of procedural preferences.  Related to this, and dependent upon it, 
the opportunity for evidence presentation (voice) was identified as a substantial variable 
connected to procedural satisfaction.  These two aspects of control came be known as 
decision control and process control, respectively.  Specifically related to secondary 
victims, decision control states that their perception of justice is maximised when they 
perceive that they have influenced a justice judgment.  In comparison, process control 
states that justice is achieved for secondary victims not simply through their perceived 
influence on a decision-maker, but through procedures that led to a decision in the first 
place.  Generally, based on Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) research, it would be expected 
that justice would be perceived by secondary victims under these rules if they were 
treated equally to others and the same over time, with objectivity, morality and fairness.  
Concurrently, decisions handed down to disputing parties would be seen by secondary 
victims to uphold justice if they were well considered, open to appeal, and inclusive of 
the parties involved.  Unfortunately, Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) research was 
somewhat restricted in its capacity to be generalised, as the information was largely 
obtained through laboratory experiments.  Although this was beneficial in the ability to 
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control most extraneous variables, it could not capture the intricacies of legal processes.  
They therefore sought to clarify their findings in subsequent research. 
 
Thibaut and Walker’s Theory of Procedural Justice 
 
In 1978, Thibaut and Walker developed a theory of procedural justice that they 
hoped would expand and consolidate the theoretical ideas in their book.  Developing a 
model for conflict resolution using their own established theoretical understandings, 
they attempted to outline what procedures were optimal in certain types of disputes, 
rather than the mechanisms by which people evaluated procedural fairness itself.  They 
assumed that if individuals experienced justice procedures that promoted the most 
accurate decisions in a particular type of dispute, they would inevitably gain a sense that 
justice had been achieved.  However, this was not necessarily the case. 
Concerning the first type of dispute – those dealing with objective truths and 
facts – they argued that the main criterion for successful dispute resolution was the 
accuracy or correctness of decisions resulting from a particular procedure (Thibaut & 
Walker, 1978).  Provided the procedures remained unbiased and the resolution was 
accurate, the end result would be accepted regardless.  Therefore, in resolving such 
disputes, they concluded that inquisitorial procedures that tended to maximise accuracy 
and minimise bias should ideally be used. 
Thibaut and Walker (1978) assessed disputes involving the distribution of 
outcomes as comparatively more problematic.  They explained that the successful 
resolution of these disputes depended on whether the outcome distribution met societal 
definitions of fairness.  They suggested that most civil and criminal disputes were in this 
category, because any outcome that satisfied one party was not likely to satisfy the 
other.  This echoed key problems previously identified by distributive justice 
researchers, particularly the applicability of the equality principle to the criminal justice 
arena. 
Additionally, Thibaut and Walker (1978) postulated that in order for procedural 
justice to be achieved in conflict of interest situations – as opposed to mere conflicts of 
cognition – process control should be placed in the hands of the disputants.  This was 
because they would be in the best position to provide relevant information to the dispute 
decision-maker. It was concluded that although such procedures can indeed be fraught 
with inaccuracy, their use maximises fairness, and it remains the perception of justice 
that is important to disputants.  This is of particular relevance to the present study, as it 
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is these perceptions that individuals might use to draw conclusions about their 
circumstances, and inform their thoughts and behaviours. 
Overall, Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) theory development was significant for 
two main reasons: it mobilised existing research and prompted subsequent research, as 
well as suggesting that no single criterion could maximise both fairness and accuracy 
(Lind & Tyler, 1988).  Nevertheless, it did have limitations, including that Thibaut and 
Walker were only able to define procedural justice in terms of which procedures were 
best (distinct from which were preferred) in what circumstances, rather than how people 
actually evaluated the fairness of procedures.  This concept of evaluation was 
subsequently addressed by Leventhal (1980). 
 
Leventhal’s Rules of Justice 
 
Not long after the work conducted by Thibaut and Walker, Leventhal (1980) 
investigated procedural justice as a part of looking at fairness in social relationships.  He 
postulated that there were six procedural justice criteria that needed to be satisfied in 
order for procedures to be seen as fair.  Additionally, he explained that because there 
were few relevant studies, his primary evidence for the theoretical criteria was based on 
descriptions of organisations by other commentators, and his own observations of 
groups.  Firstly, he outlined the consistency rule.  This refers to the similarity of 
treatment and outcomes across people, and over time.  This rule suggests that to feel 
justice has been done in their circumstances, secondary victims must believe they have 
the same rights as all other interested parties and are dealt with equally under a 
particular justice procedure.  Next was the bias-suppression rule, which involves the 
capacity of the procedure to prevent favouritism or other external biases.  Examples of 
this rule that secondary victims might feel could lead to injustice could be the justice 
decision-maker having a vested interest in the outcome of the procedure, or being 
unduly influenced by prior beliefs so that all points of view are not adequately 
addressed.  Thirdly, decision quality or accuracy refers to the ability of a procedure to 
affect solutions of objectively high quality.  This rule suggests that it would be 
important to secondary victims that procedural decisions were made with as much 
reliable information and informed opinion as possible.  Fourthly, correctability pertains 
to the existence of legitimate avenues to correct unfair or inaccurate decisions.  This 
indicates that secondary victims are likely to find it important to have access to 
grievance procedures and appeals.  Next, representation is a broad rule that dealt with 
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the degree to which parties affected by a decision were allowed to be involved in the 
decision-making process.  This concept was established in Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) 
process control criteria, indicating that secondary victims are likely to achieve a sense of 
justice if they perceive they have influenced a justice judgement.  Lastly, ethicality 
refers to the degree to which the process is accorded with general standards of fairness 
and morality.  It is important to note here that Leventhal (1980) did not conduct an 
empirical investigation to lend support to his proposed criteria.  Nevertheless, research 
has shown some support for these rules in a wide range of contexts, including among 
student attitudes towards drug testing policies (Wagner & Moriarty, 2002), CEOs of 
small organisations (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1996), and older adolescents evaluations of 
fairness in the context of family decision making (Jackson & Fondacaro, 1999).  
Despite such support, others have argued that Leventhal’s (1980) rules are difficult to 
operationalise as they are too all-inclusive and overestimate the role of outcome 
favourability and distributive fairness as influencing judgments in procedural justice 
(Lind & Tyler, 1988).  This criticism has been based on a number of empirical studies 
that investigated procedural justice, some of which will be described below. 
 
 
The Importance of Voice 
 
Researchers of procedural justice subsequent to the work of Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) and Leventhal (1980) focussed largely on the conditions under which the 
opportunities to present evidence and argument did or did not occur.  For example, 
Folger (1977) involved 80 eleven-year-old boys in a rewarded card sorting task to 
assess the perceived importance of individuals participating in a decision-making 
process by expressing their opinion about the preferred allocation.  The participants 
performed the task for 10 periods of time, and after each interval a confederate of the 
experimenter acting as a manager decided how he and the participant would divide a 
small monetary reward.  The key finding as it related to procedural justice was that a 
pay sequence that remained constant was perceived as fairer when the participants were 
given the opportunity to voice their opinion.  Furthermore, the participants who had this 
opportunity tended to express more satisfaction with the allocation process than those 
who did not. 
Additionally, Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker and Thibaut (1980) examined the 
effects of procedures on reactions to an adjudication outcome.  Employing a research 
design similar to Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) business simulation experiment, but 
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using more refined measures, they involved 111 male undergraduates in a mock-trial 
scenario.  The verdicts that participants received were determined using an adversarial 
or inquisitive procedure, and thus high or low in perceived procedural justice, 
respectively.  Participants’ perceptions of the trial process were assessed either before or 
after the verdict was declared, and subsequent measures evaluated the perceptions of the 
verdict and overall perceptions of procedural and distributive fairness.  Results echoed 
previous research that indicated the verdict was seen as more fair, satisfying, accurate 
and unbiased when it came at the culmination of an adversarial procedure.  Later 
research on the importance of voice in procedural justice would demonstrate further 
support for findings such as these.  For example, as van Prooijen, Karremans and van 
Beest (2006) explained, comparisons between voice and no-voice procedures have been 
found to increase positive affect, decrease negative affect, improve task performance, 
improve peoples’ relations with authorities, and increase individual willingness to 
accept decisions.  Additionally, Lind, Kanfer and Earley (1990) varied whether 
participants in a goal-setting situation were given a chance to voice their opinions 
before or after the goal was set, or not at all.  They found that both pre- and post-
decision voice led to higher fairness judgements than no voice did, with the opportunity 
for participants to voice their opinions before the goal was set leading to higher fairness 
judgments then giving their opinions after it was set.  The concept of voice is also 
important because research has shown that it incorporates both instrumental and non-
instrumental aspects (van den Bos & van Prooijen, 2001). 
Overall, this suggests that secondary victims are likely to perceive that justice 
can be achieved more readily through procedures that place the disputants at odds with 
each other, with an objective third-party decision-maker presiding, and when they have 
an opportunity to voice their opinion before decisions are made. 
 
Field Studies in Procedural Justice 
 
Further into the 1980s, procedural justice research expanded to include field 
studies.  For example, in an early field study into procedural justice, Houlden (1980-81) 
sought to determine whether various differences in plea-bargaining procedures would 
increase defendants’ satisfaction with the formal justice process.  By comparing remand 
prisoners with university graduates, she found that people preferred a chance to present 
evidence and opinion in legal situations because it gave them a greater sense of having 
achieved justice.  Additionally, Tyler, Rasinski and Spodick (1985) looked at the 
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relationship between process and decision control and found that having a voice in 
procedural matters appeared unrelated to the influence of this voice on the decisions 
made.  Tyler (1987) further investigated psychological explanations for having a voice 
in justice procedures, independent of any influence on outcomes.  He suggested that the 
idea of voice having intrinsic value could be a result of a number of variables, such as a 
belief that a decision-maker had acted in good faith, as well as from assumptions that 
the individual’s views were being taken into account.  After interviewing 560 
participants who had had contact with the legal system, Tyler (1987) concluded that the 
psychological mechanisms underlying acceptance of authorities suggested that it was 
important that individuals’ point of view was considered, and not just heard, regardless 
of the outcome.  Furthermore, one of the key criticisms of procedural justice at that time 
– that it was only relevant in trivial matters – was not supported.  Subsequent research 
by Tyler and his colleagues also supported this (e.g., Caspar, Tyler & Fisher, 1988).  
Overall, this research highlights the importance of secondary victim participants in 
formal justice procedures having input into those procedures.  In the context of criminal 
justice, and specifically in terms of the experience of secondary victims, it clearly 
indicates that a sense of justice is facilitated by having their views, opinions and goals 
heard by decision makers. 
However, despite solid support for the importance of procedural justice up to 
this point, questions remained as to the actual mechanisms people used to determine fair 
procedures.  Tyler (1988) continued his research in this area in an attempt to answer 
such questions.  He studied different characteristics of treatment experience, 
characteristics of the individual such as race, sex, age, education and income, the 
universality of procedural justice criteria and the relationship of these variables with 
each other, and their overall importance.  Reanalysing data from 652 participants that 
had been randomly selected from citizens of Chicago four years previously, Tyler 
(1988) began by assessing a large number of variables, and various dimensions of these 
variables, in order to ascertain the meaning of procedural justice.  The variables 
included: Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) process control and decision control, and 
Leventhal’s (1980) representativeness; consistency; impartiality and neutrality defined 
as a lack of bias and an effort to be honest and fair; decision accuracy pertaining to 
perceived accountability and forthrightness; correctability based on the capacity to 
complain about the process, and; ethicality, judged by authorities politeness and concern 
for individuals’ rights.  Results of regression analyses of participant responses showed 
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that seven aspects of procedural justice made an independent contribution to 
assessments of process fairness: the effort of authorities to be fair, their effort to be 
honest, whether their behaviour adhered to ethical standards, whether there was the 
opportunity for representation, the quality of the decision made, whether appeals were 
possible, and whether there was perceived bias in the authorities’ behaviours.  A total of 
sixty-four percent of variance was accounted for by these procedural justice factors.  
Further analysis did not support the universality of procedural justice and the 
relationships among its criteria.  In other words, it seemed that the fairness of 
procedures was not always judged by the same criteria in all circumstances. 
This finding was also uncovered by Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986).  These 
authors found that in formal settings, people placed comparatively more emphasis on 
bias suppression, decision quality, consistency and representation.  This indicated that 
there was a broad distinction between internal and external comparison standards, and 
people seemed concerned with different concepts under different circumstances.  These 
results appear to demonstrate further support for the likelihood of secondary victims 
taking a comparative and contextual view of justice, in that their circumstances could 
direct their sense of justice, rather than any personal characteristics specific to them.  
Barrett-Howard and Tyler’s (1986) work also supported Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) 
initial hypothesis that the way legal decisions are made could affect litigant reactions to 
those decisions.  It is noteworthy that the criteria participants most used to assess 
process fairness in this study were the aspects of procedure least linked to outcomes.  
This reinforces the idea that procedural concerns for secondary victims are possibly 
quite distinct from their concern with outcomes.  In any event, Tyler’s (1988) 
comprehensive work illustrated that procedural justice could be understood beyond the 
mechanisms of self-interest.  In the context of the current study, it seems to suggest that 
secondary victims’ sense of justice might vary according to the context of their 
situation, and what variables they consider when making judgments of fairness, rather 
than inherent characteristics of the particular individual. 
Based on Tyler’s (1988) findings, and as a result of conducting an analysis of 
findings common to procedural justice research up to that point, Lind and Tyler (1988) 
proceeded to outline a group-value theory of procedural justice.   
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Lind and Tyler’s Group-Value Theory 
 
Lind and Tyler (1988) believed that procedural justice research indicated that 
people were concerned about their long-term social relationship with the authorities or 
institutions acting as third parties (for example, criminal justice decision makers).  Their 
view was that this was the case because people inherently valued membership with 
social groups, and found identification with such groups as rewarding.  Furthermore, 
they suggested that people identified strongly with the legal system, even as it was a 
much larger ‘group’ than family or work groups, and could feel a sense of connection to 
it.  As such, they believed that people would become concerned with three justice 
variables not necessarily just connected to decision control.  These were neutrality of 
the decision-making procedure, trust in the party making that decision, and information 
the experience communicated about social standing.  Lind and Tyler (1988) believed 
that these variables could have an effect on peoples’ reactions to experiences that were 
independent of the influence of outcome favourability.  Such findings highlighted the 
shared nature of justice, in addition to the contextual importance of it.  Relating these 
findings to secondary victims, it suggests that their sense of justice is dependent on the 
nature of their relationships with criminal justice decision makers – particularly whether 
they feel they trust such people as well as feeling connected to them as part of a larger 
group. 
 
Summary of Procedural Justice 
 
From its theoretical origins in the 1970s, procedural justice has developed to 
become a key influential concept in both psychology and law.  The outcomes of 
procedural justice research has demonstrated that it is reasonable to assert that 
secondary victims are influenced by their assessment of the fairness of the procedures 
through which decisions are made and rules are applied.  Additionally, research in this 
area suggests that it is important that they have trust in the neutrality of the justice 
system, and that they are likely to prefer the objectivity associated with third party 
control in order to achieve justice.  Other research leads us to infer that secondary 
victims’ perceptions of justice outcomes can be affected by things such as the order of 
evidence presentation in a criminal trial, the type of justice system within which the 
procedures occur, the perception that the ‘true facts’ are being presented in a case, and 
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the perception that there is some perceived control over the final decision.  Furthermore, 
it could be expected that communication is important to secondary victims to perceive 
that justice has been achieved for them, including being heard by decision-makers, 
being treated with dignity, and having their views being taken into account when 
decisions are made.  Overall, it is likely that procedural justice is dependent on 
individual secondary victims’ circumstances in much the same way as aspects of 
distributive and retributive justice are.  This is because they can perceive justice has 
been done in their circumstance based on their own experience of procedures, and what 
they personally view as being important to them.  Also, as with the other types of justice 
discussed, relational factors and the context of a situation might both play a role in the 
degree to which secondary victims can find justice through a procedural perspective.  
For example, the type of crime a secondary victim’s loved one experiences may affect 
the secondary victim’s view of justice procedures, as can the degree to which they trust 
and feel connected to justice decision makers. 
Overall, procedural justice research suggests strongly that secondary victims 
appear to assess the capacity of procedures to provide them with a sense of justice.  In 
the context of the criminal justice system, such procedures tend to be well established 
and well known.  However, a comparatively more recent set of justice-oriented 
procedures gaining increasing interest are those with a focus away from the 
prescriptions of institutionalised legal processes.  This form of justice is concerned with 
the restoration of community and interpersonal relationships as well as reparation of the 
effects of crime, and is known as restorative justice (Zehr, 1985).  This type of justice is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 
Restorative Justice 
 
Restorative justice refers to the process by which all stakeholders involved in an 
injustice participate in dialogue to discuss its effect on them (Braithwaite, 2002), 
promote repair of the psychological harm caused by a crime (Aertsen & Willemsens, 
2001), and on rebuilding relationships (Bazemore, 2001). 
 
The Origins of Restorative Justice 
 
Although the suggestion of using restorative practices as a viable option in 
criminal justice proceedings was made as far back as the 1960s (Bazemore, 2001), 
  34 
general acceptance of them did not occur until much later.  Institutionalised restorative 
alternatives to traditional dispute resolution methods were devised by those seeking 
change in criminal justice procedures during the 1980s, and came about as a response to 
a number of differing trends in criminal justice itself (London, 2003).  These included 
the “Nothing Works” assertions of Martinson (1974), who argued that rehabilitation 
programs were frequently inconsistent and showed poor results.  Trends at this time 
appeared to show that legislators tended to prefer the idea of punishment as a morally 
based response to offenders, aimed only at incapacitating them.  Despite this approach, 
crime rates continued to rise, and the justice system became at risk of being seen as 
ineffectual and unresponsive to the needs of victims and the community (London, 
2003).  Simultaneously, a movement toward increasing victims’ rights was aiming to 
achieve criminal justice acceptance of victims’ entitlement to services, compensation, 
restitution and an active intervention in the justice process (Wallace, 1998).  Added to 
this was a strong increase in the interest of community-based policing and justice from 
the 1980s and into the 1990s (London, 2003), as well as the study of the role of the law 
as a therapeutic agent, known as therapeutic jurisprudence (Wexler, 1992).  It was from 
this interconnected mixture of concepts that the restorative justice paradigm arose.  It 
then led to a number of justice mechanisms such as victim-offender mediation, family 
group conferencing, victim impact statements, and sentencing circles (Tracy, 1998).  
These mechanisms all reflect the important concepts necessary for them to be 
considered restorative. 
 
Concepts in Restorative Justice 
 
The restorative process requires that the offender and victim have a willingness 
to communicate and possibly change their attitudes as a result.  There is an emphasis in 
restorative practices on recompense by the offender to the victim and to society, and the 
reduction of the role of legal authorities in the legal process (Radelet & Borg, 2000).  
Generally, such practices focus on accountability, rehabilitation, and community 
integration.  London (2003) explains that the fundamental innovation of restorative 
justice is in its intent, rather than in particular applications, with the ultimate goal being 
the repair of the harm caused by crime.  A core value involved in this process is that of 
restoring trust, pertaining not only to personal relations and in the individual who 
committed the crime, but also in societal relations.  This is highlighted in the restorative 
model’s conceptualisation of offenders’ criminal actions as the breaking of social 
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bonds.  Restorative justice paradigms therefore dictate that there are at least three 
stakeholders in justice: the victim, the offender and the community (Zehr, 2004).  Each 
have their legitimate needs; the victim requires atonement and compensation, the 
offender needs to be given a chance to accept responsibility, make amends for their 
actions, and to reintegrate into the community, and the community itself needs a 
guarantee of public safety (Van Ness, 1993). 
As Bazemore (2001) explains, there are three interrelated concepts that form the 
basis of all restorative justice initiatives: repair, stakeholder involvement and the 
transformation of community, and government roles in the response to crime.  Firstly, 
there is the idea of repairing harm, which can be divided into five dimensions.  These 
include compensation to victims and communities, stakeholder satisfaction, norm 
affirmation, relationship building and crime prevention.  On a theoretical level, the 
focus on repair can create a balance between the often too narrow individualised 
tendencies of offender-focussed treatments and punishment paradigms that target all 
offenders.  Secondly, stakeholder involvement states that all parties must be involved 
and be given opportunities to contribute and participate in the justice process from an 
early stage and as often as possible (Van Ness & Strong, 1997).  This operates as a 
response to the structure and formal procedures of courts, which often result in barriers 
to creative solution-focussed ideas and the expression of emotion.  Lastly, the idea that 
community and governmental roles need to be critically appraised arises out of the 
belief that there are constraints on the government’s response to crime, and that while it 
can do well to preserve order, the community is better able to establish peace.  It is also 
community and family members who are in the best position to provide support and 
guidance, particularly where young offenders are concerned (Bazemore, 2001). 
In the context of the current study, it is important to note that restorative justice 
can be preferred by secondary victims in a number of different ways, and there seem to 
be several conditions that must be in place in order to maximise a sense of achieving 
justice (Bazemore, 2001).  These include: a focus on shifting the responsibility for 
justice away from formalised governmental responses, frequent and inclusive secondary 
victim contributions to the restorative process, and some effort perceived by the 
secondary victim concerning the offender compensating for their actions.  Therefore, as 
with other types of justice, restorative justice is dependent upon the relationships with, 
and the actions of, others. 
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Support for Restorative Justice 
 
There appears to be broad support in the relevant literature for restorative justice 
practices because they appeal to both liberal and conservative schools of thought 
concerning the processing of offenders; the former because of its balanced approach and 
humanistic viewpoint, and the latter because of the compensatory aspect and focus on 
victims' rights (Levrant et al., 1999).  Roberts and Stalans (2004) believe that the 
popularity of restorative justice is explained by the theoretical frameworks of the group-
value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and attribution theory (Heider, 1958).  The former 
dictates that procedures found to reaffirm group membership (in this case, positive 
community relationships) will be regarded positively.  The latter postulates that people 
attempt to identify the causes of other people’s behaviour in order to make an 
individualised assessment of both the responsibility and blameworthiness of an 
offender.  For example, people may make determinations of whether a crime was 
committed by an individual due to internal factors (eg., personality), or external factors 
(eg., influence from others) and prefer differing outcomes as a result (Roberts & 
Stalans, 2004). 
In the context of the current study, research has shown that victims endorse 
mixed support for restorative justice.  For example, while some findings have shown 
that successful restorative programs can lead to a reported reduction in victim anxiety 
(e.g., Tracy, 1998), as well as general psychological harm (e.g., Sherman et al., 2005), 
other research indicates that victims do not want the burden of decision making power 
(Wemmer & Cyr, 2004).  It may also be the case that such findings relate to secondary 
victims as well.  However, despite the recognised positive outcomes of restorative 
justice programs, some cautions have been noted.  For example, in outlining some of the 
problems with restorative justice, Levrant and his colleagues (Levrant, Cullen, Fulton & 
Wozniak, 1999) noted that restorative systems lack the due process protections and 
procedural safeguards afforded to offenders in the more formal adversarial system of 
justice.  Additionally, the increased influence the community has in sanctioning 
offenders can lead to restorative type programs targeting low-risk minor offenders, and 
place more control over their lives than is necessary.  Furthermore, restorative justice 
initiatives may increase punishment, particularly if efforts to develop restorative justice 
policies and programs do not allow for the successful reintegration of offenders back 
into society.  Overall, it is a common criticism of restorative justice that while it is an 
approach to justice which has merit, the application of it as a methodology is potentially 
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problematic (Levrant et al., 1999).  This has implications for the current study, 
specifically relating to whether these concerns translate to secondary victims’ 
willingness to use restorative justice practices, or if they see restorative justice as a 
viable means of obtaining a sense of justice for them. 
In addition to these practical concerns, Schehr and Milovanovic (1999) outlined 
some theoretical and philosophical criticisms of restorative justice mechanisms.  For 
example, they postulated that stakeholders can be affected by communication and 
interaction styles that limit the prospects for the repair of harm so central to restorative 
justice.  Additionally, they believed that individuals may not be adequately represented 
during restorative conflict resolutions.  This may be particularly relevant to secondary 
victims of violent crime, as the focus of the restorative justice is more likely to be the 
primary victim.  Furthermore, Schehr and Milovanovic (1999) questioned the 
assumption that the structured resolutions common to restorative practices are an ideal, 
rather than the acceptance of more flexible settlements that take into account the 
possibility of revision, change, deletion and substitution. 
Despite these criticisms, restorative justice maintains an important role in the 
criminal justice system, and this importance appears to be widely recognised.    This is 
particularly the case in juvenile justice because of the focus on rehabilitation, rather than 
non-utilitarian punishment (Moon, Sundt, Cullen & Wright, 2000).  Generally, 
restorative practices, such as Family Group Conferences, victim impact statements and 
sentencing circles (Tracy, 1998) are now used in many jurisdictions, and the procedural 
guidelines for their use have increasingly served to legitimise them.  For example, in 
2000, the United Nations considered the need for basic principles to guide member 
states in adopting restorative programs, and these principles were subsequently 
formalised in 2002 (United Nations, 2000).  Actions such as this are indicative of an 
extensive recognition of restorative justice, and highlight its continuing 
acknowledgment as an important theory of justice.  Therefore, it is important to access 
the degree to which secondary victims of violent crime subscribe to it as a means of 
achieving justice in their circumstances. 
 
 
The Present Study 
 
There is clearly a need for investigation into the experiences of secondary 
victims of violent crime as they specifically relate to perceptions of justice.  As 
previously noted, such investigation is necessary not only because legal decisions and 
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policies can be influenced by secondary victims’ views, but also because it will inform 
how forensic psychology can best respond to their needs.  Specifically, knowledge 
about how they perceive justice can help those who work with them in their recovery 
from victimisation, and help tailor interventions to meet their particular requirements.  It 
is therefore important for forensic psychologists to understand the processes and 
elements of their justice perceptions.  However, no research has thus far attempted to 
determine what secondary victims’ perceptions are and how well traditional theories of 
justice can account for them. 
This thesis aimed to access secondary victims’ experiences and perceptions of 
justice by conducting an investigation in two stages.  In the first stage, qualitative 
analysis of secondary victims of violent crime was conducted in order to determine how 
successfully the four main existing theories of justice – distributive, retributive, 
procedural, and restorative justice – could account for their justice experiences and 
perceptions. 
A second, quantitative stage of research then expanded on two Stage One 
intermediate themes that related uniquely to secondary victims.  These themes showed 
that participants considered various offender- and primary victim-related concepts in 
determining if justice had been served.  This was done in order to investigate further 
support for these aspects of victimisation that secondary victims appear to consider 
when making justice judgments, and to provide a more comprehensive picture of how 
potential secondary victims of violent crime experience and perceive justice. 
 
Method 
 
Research Design 
 
For the first stage of inquiry, a combined qualitative and quantitative design was 
used.  Specifically, a generic qualitative approach was adopted in conjunction with the 
collection of quantitative participant information. 
Caelli, Ray and Mill (2003) argue that studies aiming for credibility as generic 
qualitative research must address four key areas: Firstly, the theoretical positioning of 
the researcher; secondly, the congruence between methodology and methods; thirdly, 
the strategies to establish rigour, and lastly, the analytic lens through which data are 
examined.  These four areas will be addressed below. 
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Firstly, an interpretive phenomenological approach was taken in this research as 
it was necessary to not just employ a critical reflection on the conscious experience of 
participants and to uncover the essential invariant features of that experience (Jopling, 
1996), but also to understand the participants’ perspectives of meaning (Chapman & 
Smith, 2002).  It was assumed that people possess stocks of knowledge made up of 
commonsense constructs and categories that are essentially social in action.  Therefore, 
as phenomenology dictates that a person’s life is a socially constructed totality in which 
experiences interrelate coherently and meaningfully, the views and experiences of 
secondary victims themselves were seen as the key legitimate source of data (Goulding, 
2005).  However, in order to make sense of the experiences of participants, concepts 
developed by the researcher through the interpretive process were also required. 
Secondly, in keeping with a phenomenological methodology, the use of content 
analysis (Neuendorf, 2002) was used to analyse qualitative data, and as suggested by 
Colaizzi (1978) was done so in seven stages.  These will be discussed late in the section 
addressing data analysis. 
Thirdly, the methodological rigour of this research was safeguarded on a number 
of different levels, as suggested by Patton (2002).  Primarily, principles of scientific 
inquiry were used to design the study itself, as well as to inform the data gathering and 
analyse the results.  Additionally, the values and preconceptions of the researcher were 
recognised as a possible confounding factor, and time was taken to specifically identify 
them and create awareness in order to mitigate their influence.  Furthermore, an audit 
trail of information (Patton, 2002), including a research diary, was used to verify the 
consistency of the fieldwork and reflect upon emerging themes in the data as it was 
collected.  A strong focus was also placed upon taking a phenomenological perspective, 
while avoiding the researcher’s personal perspectives. 
Lastly, it was understood that through this type of phenomenological qualitative 
inquiry, there was the opportunity not only to learn about the experiences of others, but 
also to examine the experiences of the researcher brought to the investigation.  This is 
because these experiences can, to some extent, affect what is studied and help shape 
what is discovered.  “Empathic neutrality” (Patton, 2002, p. 50) was employed in an 
effort to strike a balance between becoming too involved, which could cloud judgment, 
and remaining too distant, which could reduce understanding.  It was maintained 
through mindfulness and frequent critical reassessment of personal reactions in the 
process of interviewing participants, and the subsequent transcribing of the interviews.  
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Empathic neutrality was seen as the correct approach because it would involve 
understanding, interest, and caring about participants and their experiences, while 
maintaining a non-judgmental stance. 
 
Participants 
 
Purposeful sampling was used to access participants.  They consisted of a total 
of 22 male and female relatives or friends of victims of violent, non-sexual violent 
crime.  All participants were 18 years and older.  Exclusion criteria for participants were 
firstly that the offence had not occurred within the last five years, secondly, that the 
primary victim was not subject to domestic violence or other intra-familial abuse, and 
lastly, that the primary victim had not died as a result of the offence.  These criteria 
were designed to filter out participants who had been secondary victims of recent, 
prolonged or particularly severe offences.  This was done to maximise the possibility 
that participants had either sufficiently recovered from, or had not originally been 
subjected to, any debilitating trauma associated with the primary victims’ experiences.  
The process was also aimed at avoiding the creation of a participant pool that held 
views about justice that were clouded by the recency, intensity, or severity of trauma, 
and would produce data that was unrepresentative of typical secondary victims’ 
experiences.  Furthermore, from an ethical standpoint, this was done to limit the risk of 
participant re-traumatisation. 
The initial participant response rate was very low.  Similar problems have been 
noted with other research dealing with the impact of crime and victimology (e.g., Orth, 
2004), and it may have been a function of potential participants wishing to avoid 
discussing unpleasant events.  For example, Rosenbaum and Langhinrichen-Rohling 
(2006) have noted that in trauma research, the potential costs can be emotional upset, 
shame, stigma, safety and a loss of anonymity.  In any event, the exclusion criteria were 
eventually relaxed to rule out only individuals that were under the age of 18.  As a 
result, all possible participants over the age limit with secondary victimisation were 
eligible.  While this was not ideal, it has previously been noted that there are often 
challenges in recruiting a vulnerable population for qualitative study, and revision of 
initial exclusion criteria is not uncommon (e.g., Chiang, Keatinge & Williams, 2001) 
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Materials 
 
The participants were initially obtained through an advertisement in local print 
media, as well as using an article in the same issue designed to highlight the research.  
Both the print media advertisement and article stated the nature of the research, the 
names of relevant investigating parties, and described the parameters of the study, 
including the exclusion criteria.  Contact details of an independent party for the 
purposes of further queries were outlined, as well as information stating that the project 
had been granted ethics approval and would remain confidential. 
In response to insufficient numbers of participants volunteering as the research 
progressed, alternative measures were used to generate interest, including leaflets 
distributed to about 1000 homes in the local area. 
At the beginning of the study, potential participants were provided with 
documentation regarding the study and their potential participation in it.  This included 
an information sheet outlining the purpose and nature of the study, (Appendix A), and 
an informed consent document (see appendix B) to sign if they agreed to participate.  A 
brochure of available psychological services was provided to participants (Appendix C) 
as well as a letter from the Edith Cowan University Psychological Services Clinic 
indicating the availability of their services to participants (Appendix D), should they 
require them. 
For the initial phase of data collection, both a structured and unstructured 
questionnaire was used to elicit information.  The interviews began with an interviewer-
administered structured questionnaire (Appendix E), which gathered data on the 
participant’s and the victim’s demographic information, the impact of the event on the 
participant as well as their understanding of how the victim was affected.  Additionally, 
the specific nature of the offence was discussed, as was the subsequent involvement of 
the legal system, if applicable, and their interpretation of these experiences.  If there was 
no involvement by the legal system, the questionnaire prompted the interviewer to ask 
the participants how they reacted to that, and to explore what feelings they might have 
encountered if they were required to attend court. 
In order to maintain confidentiality, the collected interview data did not include 
any identifying features of the interviewees.  A pseudonym was used for each interview 
and maintained throughout the entire research project. 
After completing the questionnaire, an unstructured interview format was used 
to pursue qualitative data (Appendix F).  This included prompts such as the following: 
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What happened in your case?, What outcome did you want for the offender?, Were you 
satisfied with your level of involvement in the case?, What does justice mean to you?, 
For whom has justice been achieved in this case?, and What did you feel needed to have 
occurred to feel that justice had been done?  These interviews were also recorded using 
a digital voice recorder and complemented with field notes. 
 
Procedure 
 
In the early progression of the research, upon responding to the advertisement 
and contacting the researcher by telephone, the participants were reminded of the nature 
and purpose of the study, as well as the credentials of the researcher.  At this stage, the 
suitability of the individual participant to the research criteria was determined.  In the 
event that the potential participants could not directly speak to the researcher, they were 
given an opportunity to leave a message so that they could be contacted.  To ensure 
confidentiality, it was ensured that these messages were only be able to be accessed by 
the researcher, and all messages were erased after use.  Interviews that were conducted 
were done so primarily on the Joondalup Campus of Edith Cowan University in Perth, 
Western Australia, in a room specifically set aside for this purpose.  If the participant 
preferred, the interview took place at another appropriate location, however this rarely 
occurred.  The interviews were conducted over several years from 2005. 
Before data collection began, potential participants were given the information 
sheet outlining the purpose and nature of the study (Appendix A).  If they agreed to 
participate, they then signed a consent form (see appendix B).  Also, prior to any 
interview, in addition to the information sheet and consent form, a brochure of available 
psychological services was provided to participants (Appendix C) as well as a letter 
from the Edith Cowan University Psychological Services Clinic (Appendix D) 
indicating the availability of their services to participants.  This was done in order to 
anticipate and address any possible unpleasant reactions participants might have had in 
speaking about sensitive topics.  It is not known if any participants accessed support 
services.  However, at the end of each interview, they were asked how they were feeling 
and encouraged to access such services if they felt it necessary.  Nevertheless, none of 
the participants appeared distressed at the conclusion of their interview session. 
The first stage of data collection involved administering the structured 
questionnaire in order to generate quantitative and demographic information about the 
participants.  After this was completed, permission was asked of the participants to 
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continue and to record the conversation, whereby an unstructured interview took place 
if they agreed.  Questions were then guided by the information provided, as per standard 
grounded theory protocol.  Then, as the interview progressed, participants were 
encouraged to elaborate on specific concepts relating to justice perceptions that they 
brought up as a result of the initial questioning.  This process generally took about 60 to 
90 minutes to complete.  Once the interviews were completed, participants were told 
that their details would be destroyed after five years.  The interview data were 
transcribed by the researcher progressively as each one was completed.  It is important 
to explain that the recorded interview information was transcribed verbatim by the 
researcher alone, as a purposeful attempt to become immersed in the data and to be 
more easily able to generate emergent insights. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics of the quantitative data were firstly investigated, including 
frequencies, distributions and central tendencies.  The qualitative approach of content 
analysis (Neuendorf, 2002) was used to analyse the unstructured interview information.  
As suggested by Colaizzi (1978), it was done so in seven stages: reading participants’ 
transcribed narratives; extracting significant statements; formulating meanings for these 
statements; clustering meaningful themes; integrating resultant themes into a rich 
description; reducing themes to an essential structure and returning to participants for 
further cross-checking if necessary. 
The process of extracting significant statements – that is, identifying key words 
and sentences relating to the phenomenon under study – was done so through a process 
of coding.  Firstly, initial coding was conducted by analysing the unstructured interview 
information into discrete parts.  Concepts were formed from information ranging from 
words or phrases, through to sentences and complete paragraphs.  A comparative 
process was conducted as these concepts were coded, in order to clarify meaning and 
consolidate initial ideas.  A total of 77 concepts were identified through this process.  
Then, after this process, further coding was undertaken where the coded concepts were 
integrated, extended, checked against collected information and interrelated.   This was 
continued to a point referred to as saturation (Bowen, 2008) was reached, where the 
coding and collection of additional data no longer contributed further themes or ideas.  
Eight intermediate themes emerged (two of which had a total of seven subthemes). 
Subsequently, these intermediate themes were subjected to selective coding, whereby 
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the core elucidated concepts were analysed in order to articulate relationships. Selective 
codes were then analysed for emerging themes, and were further distilled to create three 
overarching primary themes.  All themes were also cross-checked by a doctoral student 
researcher independent of the project.  Unfortunately, due to practical time constraints, 
the usual process in phenomenological study of referring the understood concepts back 
to the participants, was not able to be done. 
 
 
Findings and Interpretation 
 
Demographic Information 
 
Of the total of 22 participants, 59% (n=13) were female, and 41% (n=9) were 
male.  The mean age of participants at the time of interview was 36 years, and the mean 
age at the time of the offence was 30 years.  Concerning the relationship between the 
secondary and primary victim, 45% (n=10) were unrelated, and included 4 male friends, 
2 female friends, an ex-partner and 3 female partners.  Of the 55% (n=12) of remaining 
participants, all were related to the primary victim.  They included a daughter, a son, 2 
brothers, 4 sisters, 2 biological mothers, a biological father, and an aunt. 
Concerning the relationship between the victims and the offender, the offender 
was known to 59% (n=13) of the secondary victims, and 64% (n=14) of the primary 
victims.  The mean age of the offender was 28, and the offence they had committed was 
either assault (n=15; 68%), assault with an object (n=5; 23%), or murder (n=2; 9%). 
 
General findings 
 
Almost all secondary victim participants experienced a strong emotional 
reaction towards the offender having committed the offence against the primary victim, 
to the primary victim’s subsequent response to it, as well as to their own experience of 
secondary victimisation.  This emotional reaction was noted in all participants, and 
acted as an initial prompt for participants to assess their circumstances, and that of the 
primary victim.  The emotional response was primarily characterised by anger, sadness 
and anguish.  There was also a connection noted between the nature of the relationship 
with the primary victim and the type of crime perpetrated by the offender.  The 
participants that reported feeling the least sense of justice in their particular 
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circumstance were either close family relatives of the primary victim, or were secondary 
victims of homicide. 
Overall, the results suggested that there were three primary themes comprised of 
eight intermediate themes (Table 1).  These will be outlined in detail in subsequent 
sections. 
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Table 1 
 
Main themes and Corresponding Intermediate Themes and Subthemes 
 
 
Main theme    Intermediate theme 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. Secondary Victim Utility a) Advocacy 
 
    b) Facilitation 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Punishment Goals   a) Deterrence 
 
b) Vengeance 
 
c) Rehabilitation 
 
d) Compensation 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Proportionality   a) Primary Victim Considerations 
     i) physical suffering of the victim 
     ii) psychological suffering of the victim 
     iii) voice 
 
b) Offender Considerations 
i) perceived vindication through acknowledgement 
ii) compensation 
iii) adequacy of consequences 
iv) perceived responsibility 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
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 Themes 
 
Open coding of the data revealed a substantial number of concepts pertaining to 
the participants’ experiences, and their perceptions of justice.  When the process of axial 
coding was completed, these concepts were formed into eight distinct intermediate 
themes, and then into three overarching main themes.  These themes are identified and 
discussed below. 
 
1. Secondary Victim Utility  
 
This main theme is divided into the intermediate themes of Advocacy and 
Facilitation.  These refer to the role and purpose some participants felt they needed to 
take in relation to the primary victim, in order to maximise positive outcomes and 
minimise negative ones. 
As a result of the victimisation of their friend or family member, some 
participants focussed on their role as an advocate for the primary victim with the 
criminal justice system.  Others chose to act as a facilitator, regulating their own 
behaviour in order to assist the primary victim to maximise the likelihood of a perceived 
successful outcome and minimise the likelihood of victims’ re-traumatisation.  The 
experiences encompassed by this theme tended to occur in the early stages after the 
victimisation. 
 
a) Advocacy 
 
This intermediate theme refers to participants’ efforts to act on behalf of the 
primary victim. 
In general, there was a strong view held by most participants that they saw 
primary victims as being so affected by the violent crime that they required someone to 
deal with others in their place.  As such, many were often keen to assume such a role.  
This frequently involved focussing on what they perceived was required by the primary 
victim, in order to maximise their perception that justice had been achieved.  It also 
meant addressing procedural factors and questioning, clarifying, challenging or 
championing various legal processes as they pertained directly to primary victims, as 
well as on their own behalf.  This was illustrated in the following: 
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“I remember feeling that (victim) wasn’t in a position to be going through 
any of (the court process), and thought: ‘it’s up to me to make sure I step 
up and act for him’.” (Participant 5) 
 
Overall, an emphasis was placed by participants on the importance of putting 
primary victims’ needs first.  Of the participants that verbalised this notion, most did so 
as a proportionate response to the primary victim being restricted in their own ability to 
be heard.  All secondary victims who were relatives of an underage victim espoused this 
view. 
    
b) Facilitation 
 
While the previous intermediate theme of Advocacy was concerned with 
participants’ attempts to achieve justice for the victim directly, this intermediate theme 
related to efforts made by participants to facilitate primary victims’ sense of justice.  
They sought to do this through practical means, such as assisting with legal 
responsibilities in order to combat the primary victim’s stress, as well as striving to 
meet the perceived emotional needs of primary victims.  This included providing them 
with encouragement and guidance, particularly as they navigated their way through the 
legal process.  For example: 
 
“I was less concerned what happened to (offender) as a result of all this, 
and I was just more focussed on what (victim) needed and how she was 
doing.” (Participant 11) 
 
Generally, participants were concerned with conducting themselves in such a 
way as to maximise the likelihood of a perceived successful outcome in conjunction 
with minimising re-traumatisation to the primary victim. 
Additionally, many participants who held this view explained that the fact that 
they were not the direct victim meant that they saw themselves as objective.  They 
believed that this objectivity presented them with the opportunity to maximise the 
quality of the information they conveyed to authorities.  This, in turn, was seen to 
maximise the likelihood that the primary victim would experience a sense of justice, as 
noted in the following: 
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“Going to the police station the next day there was a real sense of… 
getting it right, and wanting to really do… like… you know… stand by 
(the victim) and give a true representation of what happened.  And make 
sure you said the right stuff… And then there’s that concern about… how 
can you make sure the guy really gets his comeuppance?” (Participant 9) 
 
Additionally, this intermediate theme incorporated the concerns some 
participants had about criminal justice system processes, and how they felt these 
impacted upon the primary victim’s sense of justice.  Specifically, it related to their role 
within the system and judgments they made about the processes to which they were a 
party.  Part of this concept was concerned with participants feeling anxious about 
ensuring they conveyed the correct information to legal authorities.  The idea of 
‘correct’ information was a subjective one used to describe what they perceived to be 
the information necessary to assist authorities in arresting and successfully prosecuting 
the offender.  This caused anxiety for some participants, as they stated they did not want 
to be held responsible by the primary victim for encouraging any miscarriage of justice 
through their actions. 
For some of the participants, it was necessary for the primary victims to have an 
active role in the aftermath of their victimisation, in order for a sense of justice to 
prevail.  This is in contrast to the previous intermediate theme of Advocacy, where the 
participants wanted to act on behalf of the primary victim, rather than assisting them to 
act themselves.  For example: 
 
“I had a sense of wanting to be able to repair the damage and to offer 
some sort of… to help him have some role in it, I suppose.” (Participant 
2) 
 
Others focussed on the notion of victim empowerment, whereby they sought to 
encourage the primary victims to equip themselves to create their own sense of justice 
from the circumstances thrust upon them.  Participants who felt they lacked the capacity 
to meaningfully assist the primary victim in this sense often spoke about feelings of 
helplessness.  This was the case even if they guided primary victims to seek assistance 
from professional agencies.  For example: 
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“I found it very traumatic… I know there were quite a few times where 
(the victim and I would speak about the offence) and I’d just cry for one 
hour or two hours.  I found it very hard to function sometimes, feeling like 
I couldn’t do anything…” (Participant 3) 
 
In doing so, they focussed on what restrictions were placed on their ability to 
maximise perceived positive outcomes.  In this context, some of the secondary victims 
acknowledged that they had existing frustrations about the degree to which justice could 
be achieved for primary victims in criminal cases, particularly relating to formal justice 
system processes.  
 
2. Punishment Goals 
 
This main theme was divided into the intermediate themes of Deterrence, 
Vengeance, Rehabilitation and Compensation.  It concerned secondary victims’ goals 
for punishment of the offender, in order to feel justice had been achieved in their 
circumstance. 
Many participants only appeared to focus on various goals of punishment if the 
perceived outcomes of the offender and the primary victim were deemed to be 
imbalanced.  It appeared that these particular participants endorsed various punishment 
goals aimed at redressing this imbalance. 
a) Deterrence 
 
This intermediate theme involved a need that the participants had to deter the 
specific perpetrator of the offence against the primary victim.  This was usually in the 
form of unpleasant consequences such as a lengthy period of imprisonment.  
Participants also wanted the individual perpetrator to be made to serve as an example to 
others, through formal processes such as judicial sentencing.  This was illustrated in the 
following: 
 
“I wanted him to have a sense of ‘you’ve done wrong, you get punished, 
mate’.  I think that’s what others will learn from, too… you learn from 
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that shock of ‘oh shit, I could go to gaol for this… I could get in trouble.” 
(Participant 1) 
 
Additionally, participants who articulated this concept believed that segregation 
of the offender was necessary for deterrence, and to ensure the safety of others.  In 
many cases, this need for offender segregation related to the violation by the offender of 
social norms.  In other words, these individuals held the view that by their actions, 
offenders had contradicted the unwritten rules of civil interaction between individuals in 
society, and must therefore be removed from it.  For example: 
 
“I wanted (offender) to be put away for 25 to life.  If he’s saying by his 
actions that he’s a danger to society, then he needs to be behind bars, 
away from everyone.” (Participant 21) 
 
Many hoped this would send a message to other possible perpetrators of violent 
crime through punishment of the individual offender; specifically that their actions 
would likely result in consequences such as incarceration.  The criminal justice system 
was seen by these participants to play a significant role in facilitating such an outcome. 
b) Vengeance 
 
This intermediate theme referred to a desire for revenge by participants against 
the perpetrator of the violent crime committed against the primary victim.  Participants 
who favoured a strong retributive response often did so after having assessed victim-
offender outcomes as described in the previous section.  A reference to this was the 
following: 
 
“Justice for me means some form of punishment, whether it’s 
psychological or whatever… is inflicted on the person who caused you 
pain.” (Participant 18) 
 
This view was also independent of any aims to deter the offender or anyone else; 
it simply related to the express need for the particular offender to experience pain and 
suffering for their actions.  For example: 
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“I just wanted him to go to prison and be locked up in a cell with 
someone twice his size who’s gonna sort of like bugger him stupid.” 
(Participant 14) 
 
Some participants believed that the formal criminal justice system lacked the 
unrestricted ability to bring about revenge in a way that would satisfy them. 
c) Rehabilitation 
 
This intermediate theme referred to proactive efforts preferred by participants 
aimed at reducing further violent offending by the offender. 
Despite the focus of many participants on administering severe legal 
consequences as a response to their own victimisation or that of the primary victim, 
some sought a more benevolent response.  These people were keen to see the offender 
learn from their actions, and wished to see a rehabilitative aspect to any consequences 
meted out to them.  A typical response was: 
 
“I wanted the consequences for (offender) to sort of help them make a 
link between ‘this is what I’ve done, and this is what’s happening now 
because I did that.  I wanted them to have some sort of counselling and 
support... it might help them be more empathic to the victim.” 
(Participant 15) 
 
However, for others, this also included a desire for public education established 
to assist in general offender rehabilitation (particularly efforts offenders themselves go 
through to reintegrate themselves into society and how this could be facilitated). 
 
“We have a responsibility as a society to try and support and educate 
(offenders) so that they don’t do it again, so that we don’t suffer.” 
(Participant 16) 
 
d) Compensation 
 
This intermediate theme referred to the need that participants had to see the 
offender make efforts to repay the primary victim in some way for their suffering. 
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Some participants’ focussed on the importance of victim-offender dialogue, 
through which the offender could gain an understanding of the plight of the victim.  An 
illustration of this was: 
 
“I think it would have been good if (offenders) had been made to sit down 
and have (victim) talk about what effect (the offenders) actions had on 
(the victim)… like, that’s the least they  could’ve done.” (Participant 7) 
 
  Another issue that pertained to this theme was the impact of monetary 
compensation offered to primary victims by the courts as a way of acknowledging their 
distress.  Specifically: 
 
“I thought it was fair (victim) got compensation… he really did take a 
beating, so there was a sense of justice in that, you know, he got some 
money out of it… and it there a sense of it validating what he went 
through.” (Participant 4) 
 
3. Proportionality 
 
This main theme referred to secondary victims’ need to have outcomes be 
proportionally distributed to primary victims and offenders.  It encompassed the views 
of some participants that the legal process represented a personally competitive exercise 
between the perpetrator and the victim.  As such, these participants proposed that in 
order for their court experience to be a positive one, it was necessary that a 
proportionally positive outcome for the primary victim resulted from the expenditure of 
psychological and practical resources of both primary and secondary victims.  If this 
expenditure was seen to outweigh the perceived outcome, participants believed that 
justice had not been served.  This was illustrated in the following: 
 
“There’s a winner and a loser, and I honestly feel like we lost.  That’s 
exactly how I feel.  After all we went through… we still lost.” (Participant 
20) 
 
This theme also related to participants’ focus on the balance of outcomes 
between the offender and themselves.  Specifically, participants believed that if 
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resources were employed in a practical way, they should see a proportionally positive 
outcome for themselves, in addition to that for primary victims.  If their inputs were 
seen to outweigh the perceived outcome, participants believed that justice had not been 
served.  For example: 
 
“For the amount of effort that went into getting him charged… and 
nothing happened… you sort of feel ripped off.  That it’s not worth my 
time having to go in there and go through all that.” (Participant 8) 
 
This highlighted that many participants had a sense that there was a difference 
between the ideals and procedures of the formal criminal justice system, and their own 
individualised, personal views of justice.  Put simply by one participant: 
 
“I guess seeing what the system thought was justice wasn’t what I would 
think.” (Participant 17) 
 
Although the majority of participants who spoke about this issue acknowledged 
the need for a formal criminal justice system, they also expressed the view that such a 
system may not relate to secondary victims’ desires.  For some, this meant that 
imbalanced victim-offender outcomes were inevitable.  Nevertheless, participants stated 
that proportionality was an ideal and suggested that the legal system was obliged to 
facilitate that through uniform and objective practices. 
Participants’ idea of uniformity was that processes in the criminal justice 
system, from police involvement through to actual, measureable justice outcomes, 
should maintain steadfast adherence to the same principles.  Concepts that participants 
talked about included the fact that justice principles should be agreed upon by the 
people that experience them, and should be concrete and unwavering.  While this is 
clearly a goal of legal processes, many participants felt that there were perceived 
variations between their own experience of the criminal justice system, and the 
experiences of others.  They often compared their view of the criminal justice system 
with portrayals of similar cases in the media, and from talking with others sharing 
similar experiences.  Some found that there was a degree of variation between their case 
and apparently similar cases which was unacceptable to them.  Nevertheless, some 
participants also reported experiencing a feeling of security from a sense that it was 
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possible to successfully achieve justice for any victim in any circumstance.  For 
example: 
 
“Justice is about process, it’s about… predictability, I suppose… there’s 
a safety in that… it’s about the fact that there are the same processes in 
place for everyone when they do something wrong.” (Participant 22) 
 
Participants indicated that this was also about the avoidance of preferential 
treatment, as demonstrated by the following: 
 
“I believe that if you’re following things to procedures, they’re set in 
place for a reason, and they’ve been designed and put there so that if you 
follow them then no-one will get a variance in what happens in the 
outcome of things.” (Participant 21) 
 
Participants’ idea of objectivity was also related to the processes of the formal 
criminal justice system, and was viewed as being related to both primary victims and 
secondary victims.  Specifically, it concerned the perceived importance of parties who 
had a vested interest in criminal justice outcomes from the criminal justice system itself.  
Many assumed that this indicated the criminal justice system remained objective, and 
they could have no concerns about the unwarranted impact of such parties on due 
process.  It was important for secondary victims to feel that all invested parties received 
the same treatment.  Objectivity was also deemed necessary to ensure the response of 
the parties who had been offended against (primary and secondary victims) was 
contained.  Some participants felt they needed the legal system to regulate their own 
behavioural response to their loved one’s victimisation.  Many participants assumed that 
if the decision regarding consequences for the offender was left entirely to their 
discretion, the punishment meted out to the offender would be clouded by strong 
emotions, and would most likely be excessive.  One participant explained it thus: 
 
“I do think the objectivity (of the police) was good, because clearly I 
wouldn’t have had a clear head to deal with that, you know… they didn’t 
get emotional with it, they just listened, they took our statements… we 
  56 
were all quite fired up, they didn’t buy into that.  They were very 
impartial.”(Participant 13) 
 
While secondary victim participants clearly placed importance on uniformity 
and objectivity, their main focus appeared to be about making individualised and 
intuitive judgments about whether they felt justice had been achieved through 
comparisons of victim-offender outcomes.  Lacking a sense of justice was related to 
perceiving imbalance between these outcomes.  Importantly, participants made such 
judgments by taking into account victim and offender considerations. 
 
a) Victim considerations 
 
This intermediate theme refers to aspects relating to the primary victim that 
participants took into account when judging outcomes.  Specifically, participants took 
into consideration three outcomes relating to the primary victim: 1. the physical 
suffering experienced by the victim, 2. the perceived psychological suffering 
experienced by the victim, and 3. whether they felt the victim’s views had been taken 
into account by the criminal justice system. 
 
i) Physical suffering experienced by the primary victim 
 
A sense of justice was inversely related to the participants’ perception of the 
degree of suffering sustained by the primary victim.  An outcome was more likely to be 
judged as unjust the greater the physical suffering experienced by the primary victim.  
This was particularly the case if the primary victim had sustained either long-term, 
ongoing physical suffering, or was killed.  For example: 
 
“(The offender) has mucked up the rest of (victims) lives.  They have no 
quality of life because of their injuries, so why should he?  And the kids 
have got a lot longer left in their lives than he has.” (Participant 1) 
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ii) Psychological suffering experienced by the primary victim 
 
A situation was also more likely to be judged as unjust the greater the 
psychological harm to the primary victim was perceived to be.  A good illustration of 
this was the following: 
 
“There’s nothing you can do that will even up those scales.  There’s 
never a moment that (the victim) doesn’t have that sense of ‘I have been 
violated’, and fighting the sense of ‘I’m no good’, and fighting those 
tendencies to harm themselves or the desire to kill themselves or whatever 
it is…you can’t erase those things.  You can work on them and you can 
come to a place where they’re content with their life to a degree, but you 
can’t give them back the wholeness of their life that they would have 
had.” (Participant 10) 
 
iii) Voice 
 
The less a primary victim’s views were perceived to be heard, the more likely 
the participants viewed their situation as unjust.  For example: 
 
“It was unfair that (the primary victim) didn’t get his own say… an 
opportunity to take the stand and give his version of what had 
happened…” (Participant 5) 
 
b)  Offender Considerations 
 
This intermediate theme refers to aspects relating to the offender that 
participants took into account when judging outcomes.  Specifically, participants took 
into consideration four outcomes relating to the offender: 1. whether the criminal justice 
system held the offender accountable and formally recognised their guilt, in order to 
foster victim vindication; 2. that the consequences meted out to the offender 
compensated for their anti-social actions, 3. whether they believed the consequences to 
the offender were adequate, and 4. the degree to which the offender was responsible for 
the primary victim’s suffering. 
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i) Acknowledgement of Culpability 
 
Participants looked for justice from the criminal justice system through 
consideration of whether the offender was held accountable for their actions and that 
their guilt was formally recognised.  Generally, the less an offender’s actions were 
formally recognised by the criminal justice system, the less likely a secondary victim 
was to judge a situation to be just.  For example: 
 
“I wanted someone official to say to him ‘you were in the wrong, you are 
being punished, you can’t argue with this, this is what you have to do...’  
That would give me a sense of satisfaction.” (Participant 11) 
 
Some participants articulated a need to have an identifiable offender who could 
be held accountable for the violence inflicted upon the primary victim.  Some 
participants were involved in cases where no individual had been charged or prosecuted, 
and the concept of offender identification was often the first issue they articulated.  For 
example: 
 
“Well at the moment I have no sense that justice has been done in any 
sense, because they haven’t even discovered who the (offender) is.” 
(Participant 15) 
 
Additionally, many participants spoke about personalising the victim to the 
offender, a process which appeared to be aimed at combatting an assumed 
depersonalisation process whereby the offender objectified their victims in order to 
more easily offend against them.  It is also possible that in some cases this 
personalisation was aimed at encouraging feelings of guilt and remorse in the offender.  
For example: 
 
“I think it’s important if the pain (the offender) has inflicted can be 
acknowledged.  And they need to acknowledge that directly to the 
victim.” (Participant 10) 
 
  59
Other participants framed this concept in terms of needing official action from 
the criminal justice system to acknowledge the anti-social behaviour of offenders.  For 
example: 
 
“Justice is about the courts recognising what (offenders have) done... and 
that what they’ve done is wrong.” (Participant 12) 
 
This was also significant to participants in the context of exposing what was 
believed to be the true facts (actual events) of their particular case, with an overarching 
goal of reducing the primary victims’ distress.  For example: 
 
“(The offender being declared guilty by the criminal justice system) 
validates everything... it validates (the victim’s experience) to be truthful.  
I think the worst outcome would be for the outcome to be not guilty, 
because then it says that (the offence) didn’t happen.” (Participant 9) 
 
For some participants, this was about the validation and vindication of the 
primary victims’ experiences, and was typically sought in the context of the criminal 
justice system.  This was believed by some participants to be crucial in the process of 
resolving any doubts primary victims may have had about their culpability or 
complicity in the offence committed against them.  For example: 
 
“(I) wanted (the victim) to be validated… and (be told) that it wasn’t his 
fault.” (Participant 8) 
 
ii) Compensation 
 
If participants thought that the consequences allocated to an offender as a result 
of their actions did not sufficiently make up for what happened to the primary victim, 
they were less inclined to feel justice had been achieved.  For example: 
 
“No amount of money will ever compensate (victim) for what he is like 
now, and what he went through.  Nothing.” (Participant 19) 
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iii) Adequacy of Consequences 
 
The more an offender’s consequences (for example, their custodial sentence) 
were deemed to be inadequate by the secondary victim, the more likely participants 
were to feel justice had not been achieved.  For example: 
 
“(The offender) was convicted and sentenced to a lesser crime and she... 
got away with premeditated murder basically.” (Participant 6) 
 
iv) Perceived responsibility 
 
Participants also took into account the degree to which the offender was held 
responsible for the victims’ suffering.  It appeared that the greater responsibility 
attributed by the court to the offender for the outcome of the victim, the less likely 
participants were to experience the situation as unjust.  For example: 
 
“(Victim) may have put herself in that position but (offender) did what he 
did to her and his role in that should have been acknowledged more.” 
(Participant 8) 
 
Also, the recognition by the criminal justice system of the offender’s 
responsibility for the primary victim’s suffering appeared to allow participants to feel 
that the criminal justice system was ‘on their side’ and therefore predisposed to 
facilitate the achievement of justice for the primary victim.  For example: 
 
“I can’t even believe that in the records it won’t even show to the extent 
what (offender) did to (victim)… that’s not what justice should be.” 
(Participant 3) 
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Discussion 
 
The purpose of this initial study was to explore secondary victims’ experiences 
and concepts of justice in order to determine the degree to which they could be 
accounted for by the existing theories of distributive justice, retributive justice, 
procedural justice, and restorative justice.  The themes of Stage One indicated that, to 
some extent, secondary victims’ perceptions of justice could be accounted for by some 
aspects of these traditional theories of justice.  Broadly speaking, elements of 
distributive justice theory were most evident in the main theme of Proportionality, 
elements of procedural justice theory were related to the themes of Secondary Victim 
Utility and Proportionality, and retributive and restorative principles were most directly 
linked to the theme of Punishment Goals.  There were few clear links to restorative 
justice in the findings. 
 
Distributive Justice 
 
The theme of Proportionality, highlighting participants’ focus on making 
comparisons between victims, offenders and themselves, particularly impacted by the 
psychological and practical resources they felt they had expended, echoed a number of 
justice theory principles.  For example, the judgement of input and outcome ratios seen 
in equity theory (Adams, 1965), the process of comparing outcomes, and the 
psychological distress that can come from the inequality of exchange ratios, as 
discussed in the work of Walster, Walster and Berscheid (1978).  Also, a direct 
relationship to justice theory was noted from the finding that some participants required 
the offender to receive consequences they perceived as adequate.  Research that relates 
to the perceived adequacy of consequences certainly concerns the broad idea of 
proportionality in distributive justice literature (e.g., Barber & Doob, 2004), such that 
people are motivated towards wanting individual outcomes that match inputs in an 
attempt to maintain cognitive balance (Rasinski, 1987).  These findings also lend 
support to existing criminal justice related studies (e.g., Finkel, et al., 1996), which 
show that people value proportionality in the responses to crime. 
 
 
 
  62 
Retributive Justice 
 
Links to retributive justice ideas were most closely linked to the main theme of 
Punishment Goals.  Specifically, the intermediate themes of Deterrence, Compensation, 
and Rehabilitation related well to the utilitarian approaches to punishment seen in 
retributive justice.  Both were concerned with punishment of the offender that served 
some other purpose aside from satisfying the victimised individual.  Additionally, the 
intermediate theme of Vengeance was linked to non-utilitarian concepts in retributive 
justice, in the sense that it was concerned with punishment of the offender independent 
of any secondary purpose. 
Additionally, retributive justice principles were noted in the intermediate theme 
of Offender Considerations.  For example, participants were concerned with the 
criminal justice system’s recognition of the offender’s culpability, and that 
consequences to their actions were necessary.  The overarching aim of this 
acknowledgement was to reduce primary victims’ distress.  As Frijda (1994) explained, 
victims of injustice are compelled by both individual and societal motivations to seek 
retribution, and these actions can encourage the restoration of self-esteem and societal 
norms and values.  This appeared to be a goal of secondary victims in the current 
research. 
 
 
Procedural Justice 
 
 
Aspects of procedural justice were apparent in a number of the themes of this 
research.  For example, there was some connection to Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) 
procedural justice theory of decision control in the main theme of Secondary Victim 
Utility, with many participants making sure they conveyed information to authorities 
that they felt was necessary to assist them in arresting and successfully prosecuting the 
offender (and thus influence the outcome).  Similarly, there were also links to process 
control (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), based in participants’ concerns about criminal justice 
system procedures, how they felt these impacted upon the primary victims’ sense of 
justice, and the importance they placed on their perceived objectivity. 
Additionally, the importance placed by participants on uniformity, in the process 
of making assessments of outcomes in the main theme of Proportionality, echoed many 
of Leventhal’s (1980) procedural fairness criteria, including consistency, bias 
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suppression, accuracy, and correctability.  Participants were clearly interested in equal 
treatment and outcomes across people and over time (Consistency), as well as the 
prevention of favouritism (Bias-Suppression) and the capacity to deal with unfair or 
inaccurate decisions (Correctability).  An aspect of procedural justice concept of ‘voice’ 
(Folger, 1977) was also seen in the intermediate theme of Victim Considerations, 
particularly the finding that some participants felt that primary victims needed to be not 
only heard by the criminal justice system, but understood by it.  The current findings 
clearly support research which states that victims want their views to be heard (van 
Prooijen, Karremans & van Beest, 2006), and that they value adversarial procedures 
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975). 
 
Restorative Justice 
 
Restorative justice principles did not appear to significantly account for 
participants’ views in the current research.  Some connections may have been evident in 
the intermediate theme of Offender Considerations, particularly with participants’ 
perceived importance of having someone they could hold accountable for the primary 
victim’s suffering.  In fact, the importance of being able to hold someone accountable 
for a crime is generally viewed as a central tenet of this type of justice (Radelet & Borg, 
2000).  Also, to a lesser extent, restorative justice principles were echoed in the finding 
that participants wanted the offender to recognise the impact of their actions on the 
primary victim, as this sort of recognition is an important aim of restorative justice 
practices. 
 
Unique elements of secondary victims’ perceptions 
 
While the findings of this first stage of research showed broad support, in some 
areas, for existing justice theory, the uniqueness of secondary victims’ perceptions of 
justice was also apparent.  This uniqueness appeared to stem from secondary victims 
seeking to find meaning in their experiences of the criminal justice system, the offender 
and the primary victim.  Many aspects of their experience – while having some 
connections to justice theory – did not fit neatly into one of the four main types. 
For example, as noted in the general findings, the role of emotions appeared to 
play an important part in participants’ experiences of secondary victimisation.  A strong 
emotional response was noted in almost all participants of the current research in 
  64 
response to their victimisation.  This response also acted as an initial prompt for them to 
assess their circumstances, and that of the primary victim.  There was therefore 
evidence for participants’ emotions as an outcome and motivation variable.  Although 
researchers have examined the role of emotions in justice to some degree, there appears 
to be little investigation that has done so specifically in the context of particular justice 
theories.  One example is Vidmar’s (2001) six-stage model of retributive justice 
dynamics.  As noted in the literature review of retributive justice, Vidmar concluded 
that one of the stages of retribution involved the role of emotions in developing 
reactions against a rule or norm violator.  He stated that these emotions dissipate during 
or following punishment of the violator, and as a result homeostasis is achieved and 
control is restored.  However, Vidmar acknowledged that punishment of an offender 
might actually increase anger and cognitions of harm, by validating the perception of 
harm or removing ambiguity about the offender’s motivation or character.  He 
illustrated this by asking the question: “Do relatives of a murder victim who view the 
execution of the perpetrator find peace in their cognitive and emotional selves, or does 
viewing the execution increase psychological disturbances?” (Vidmar, 2001, p. 44).  
This highlights the capacity of emotions to act as a motivating dynamic for a victimised 
person to seek justice. 
In contrast, research that has investigated the role of emotions in justice as an 
outcome variable appears to show mixed results.  For example, Barclay, Skarlicki and 
Pugh (2005) found that unfair procedures or interpersonal treatment were associated 
with elevated levels of negative emotions such as anger and hostility.  Similarly, Weiss, 
Suckow and Cropanzano (1999) also found evidence that discrete emotions, including 
anger, were influenced by both outcome and procedure.  Furthermore, Mikula, Scherer 
and Athenstaedt (1998) found that injustice attributions strongly affected the intensity 
and duration of emotions such as anger and disgust.  These studies highlight the 
dynamics that were likely playing a part in the current research regarding participants’ 
responses to the victimisation of themselves and their close others.  However, other 
research has found that emotional responses do not lead inevitably to blame and 
punishment.  For example, Goldberg, Lerner and Tetlock (1999) hypothesised that the 
relationship between emotions and punishment depended on the social context of the 
wrongdoing.  They found that when participants learned that justice was served to a 
person after an anger-eliciting event, their tendency to punish in unrelated situations 
was largely deactivated. Graham, Weiner and Zucker (1997) also subscribed to the idea 
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of the individual as an active assessor of the controllability and responsibility of the 
actions of others.  These authors suggested that although utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
motives shared common antecedents in some situations, they should be distinguished as 
separate alternatives derived at by complex individual assessment of specific cases. 
In addition to the findings of the current research relating to emotions as a 
motivation and outcome variable, the results also demonstrate the impact on 
participants’ emotional responses of both the nature of the relationship with the primary 
victim and the type of crime perpetrated by the offender.  Specifically, the participants 
that reported feeling a perceived lack of justice in their particular circumstance were 
either close family relatives of the primary victim, or were secondary victims of 
homicide.  This seems to suggest two related findings.  Firstly, that there is a connection 
between the seriousness of crime against the primary victim and feelings of injustice.  
For example, of the two participants who were secondary victims of homicide, both 
stated that they felt injustice remained in their circumstance.  This implies there may be 
a relationship between crime seriousness and the resultant need for justice, apparently 
informed by the magnitude of emotions such as outrage, grief and distress.  Therefore it 
is possible that if an offence is so serious that it produces sufficient moral and emotional 
outrage in a secondary victim, justice may be very difficult to achieve for them.  
Secondly, there may also be a relationship between the closeness of the relationship and 
feelings of persisting injustice (and by extension, a need for justice).  In the present 
study, of the participants who did not feel justice had been achieved for them, or could 
ever be achieved, three were close relatives of the victim (mother, father and sister).  
This suggests that perhaps for some people, the degree of relationship closeness to the 
victim relates directly to their own traumatisation, or the strength of their own needs, 
and this may be what can foster an ongoing sense of injustice.  In any event, this 
research seems to help inform the literature on the use of emotions as a trigger for 
making judgments about others’ experiences of justice. 
Further to these findings, the primary themes uncovered in this research revealed 
some concepts unique to secondary victims’ perceptions of justice.  For example, the 
theme of Secondary Victim Utility incorporated the finding that many participants 
looked to empower the victim as part of their role in the process of achieving justice.  
This finding does not have a direct link to theories of justice, but it is supported by non-
justice theory related research such as that of Frieze, Hymer and Greenburg (1987).  
These authors outlined that the significant others of crime victims often look to 
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empower the primary victim through supportive behaviours.  Additionally, the findings 
showed that participants’ sense of justice was often framed in terms of being wary of 
the possible deleterious impact on the primary victim of experiencing the criminal 
justice system.  Part of this experience appeared to involve the secondary victim acting 
as an advocate for the primary victim.  There is certainly some research that indicates 
someone acting as an advocate may help protect against the re-traumatisation of primary 
victims by the justice system (e.g., Campbell, 2006).  However, these advocates are 
frequently people who work in a professional capacity, and mainly for victims who are 
rape survivors. 
The findings outlined in Secondary Victim Utility further showed that the 
secondary victim participants who felt they lacked the capacity to meaningfully assist 
the primary victim were often left with feelings of helplessness.  The idea of the 
helplessness of secondary victims is an important issue that does not appear to have 
been specifically accounted for in justice theory research.  It may be that some 
participants experienced a kind of dissonance or tension that they felt could not be 
adequately resolved due to the punishment of the offender being out of their hands.  
Perhaps being unable to address this psychological discomfort successfully is indicative 
of an inability to cognitively restructure an understanding of their situation.  This 
tension may also be explained by what is known about the emotional reactions that are 
concurrent to the cognitive understanding involved in individuals’ empathic responses, 
and that people can feel discomfort and anxiety when witnessing the negative 
experiences of others (Davis, 1983). 
Furthermore, as with the importance of victim empowerment, there is no direct 
link between theories of justice and secondary victims seeking to vindicate their 
existing frustrations with the criminal justice system through their experiences of it as a 
secondary victim.  However, it is a well established psychological mechanism that 
people will tend to test hypotheses about groups of people by preferentially searching 
for confirmatory evidence (e.g., Frey, 1986; Snyder & Swann, 1978), and it seems that 
such processes may have been occurring in participants of the current research.  This 
has implications for secondary victims experiencing a sense that justice has been 
achieved for them in the long-term, as research indicates that cognitive distortions can 
be induced by preconceived beliefs.  Specifically, these distortions can result in a 
retrospective reconstruction whereby erroneous inferences (in this case, about the 
criminal justice system) can perpetuate themselves (Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978).  
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Although echoing elements of procedural justice theory, this specific concept does not 
appear to have been identified independently in any area of justice theory research.  
Nevertheless, it clearly impacts upon secondary victims’ justice perceptions, and as 
such may bear further investigation. 
In addition to the theme of Secondary Victim Utility, the theme of 
Proportionality also incorporated a number of concepts unique to secondary victims, 
despite being generally concerned with the assessments of outcomes seen in distributive 
justice.  Specifically, many of the subthemes that comprised the Victim Considerations 
and Offender Considerations intermediate themes only showed indirect connections to 
justice research.  Due to the uniqueness of the subthemes, support for them in the 
existing literature will be focussed upon individually in the following sections.  
 
Physical Suffering Experienced by the Victim 
 
The importance of the physical impact of being a victim of non-sexual violent 
crime is noted in existing psychological literature.  Robinson and Keithley (2000) 
explained that such crime can often result in permanent disability, and it is viewed as a 
major risk to health in many countries.  Anderson, Grandison and Dyson (1996) 
assessed the impact of violent crime in the United States and stated that it was 
responsible for a significant number of injuries in that country, surpassing numbers 
from vehicle accidents and placing the health system there in an increasingly weak 
position.  Campbell (2002) reviewed the medical consequences of intimate partner 
assault, and found that victims can present with serious long term health problems such 
as recurring central nervous system symptoms, and chronic pain.  In addition, diagnosed 
functional gastrointestinal disorders, self-reported cardiac symptoms, and immune 
system problems have all been noted as long-term physical effects of violence (Lown & 
Vega, 2001).  Loxton, Schofield, Hussain and Mishra (2006) also found strong links 
between violent victimisation and long-term health problems in middle aged Australian 
women.  Long-term health problems reported by victimised women included respiratory 
conditions, bowel problems, general pain, and fatigue.  Based on the results of Stage 
One of the current research, it seems that secondary victims witness such physical 
suffering in their loved ones, and this impacts negatively on their sense of attaining 
justice in their particular circumstance. 
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Perceived Psychological Suffering Experienced by the Victim 
 
The perception by secondary victims that there is long lasting emotional or 
psychological damage done to primary victims of violent crime is also supported by 
relevant psychological literature.  In conducting a review of the available research up to 
the late 1980s, Frieze, Hymer and Greenburg (1987) noted that the psychological 
impact of crime tends to follow a predictable sequence.  Firstly, there is an immediate 
reaction to the victimisation which can consist of numbness or disorientation, followed 
by emotions such as shock, disbelief or helplessness.  Longer-term, the victimised 
person shifts from an initial, disorganised phase, into a re-organisation phase in an 
attempt to cope with their victimisation.  However, they may still experience strong 
emotional reactions.  A feeling of significant loss is often reported, and can relate to a 
perceived loss of control and a sense of personal violation.  Victims can also engage in 
self-blame, develop low self-esteem, pervasive fear and relationship difficulties. 
Using data from 476 university students, 54 of whom had experienced levels of 
exposure to community violence either as a victim or a witness, Scarpa (2001) found 
that victimised participants reported significantly greater aggression and depression than 
those who were not.  Also, Brown, Hill and Lambert (2005), in assessing traumatic 
stress symptoms in a group of 90 African American women subject to community and 
partner violence, found these women reported elevated trauma symptoms as measured 
by a symptom inventory measure.  Such symptoms included those relating to mood, 
such as depression and irritability, and those relating to stress, such as intrusive thoughts 
and defensive avoidance. 
Furthermore, Mikula (1998) also stated that events experienced as unjust were 
described by people as a hindrance to satisfying their perceived needs and goals, 
suggesting a continuing impact.  These sorts of responses appear specific to violent 
crime victimisation.  To illustrate, a recent study (Kazantzis, et al., 2010), conducted in 
New Zealand, found that in a sample of 1500 participants who had experienced a 
traumatic event, 28% of people had been subjected to violent crime.  These people rated 
their psychological distress to be greater than those who had been exposed to natural 
disasters or accidents. 
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Voice 
 
As noted in the introduction to the first stage of research, the idea of “voice” is 
an important and well researched concept in procedural justice literature.  It was the 
only subtheme with clear links to existing justice theory.  However, the uniqueness of 
the concept in the current study was that it was related to secondary victims’ preference 
for having primary victims’ views heard by the criminal justice system, rather than their 
own.  Generally, this further highlights the main focus of secondary victims being the 
needs of the primary victim. 
 
Acknowledgment of Culpability 
 
As noted in the findings, the main ideas in this subtheme were secondary 
victims’ considerations of whether there was an identifiable offender, whether the 
offender was held accountable for their actions, the degree to which their guilt was 
formally recognised, and the degree to which the primary victims’ experiences were 
vindicated. 
In many ways, this aspect of subtheme is interlinked with perceived 
responsibility, in the sense that it is partly concerned with attributing responsibility to 
relevant parties.  However, while the idea of perceived responsibility is concerned with 
who is responsible for the wrong-doing (admittedly with the possibility of including the 
victim in that assessment), this subtheme is concerned with the degree the guilty party 
has been formally held to account for their actions, and that the victim was therefore 
vindicated of facilitating their own victimisation.. 
Support for the idea of offender identification and accountability as core 
concepts of justice perception is evident only in the broader fairness theory literature, 
such as the work of Folger and Cropanzano (2001).  These authors suggested there were 
three interrelated components pertaining to one individual holding another accountable: 
the existence of an unfavourable condition, caused by someone acting of their own 
discretion and volition, and the action must violate some ethical principle of 
interpersonal conduct (called a normative standard of justice by the authors).  Although 
developed within an organisational justice context, these principles also appear to relate 
to criminal justice, and the three components Folger and Cropanzano (2001) describe 
were certainly articulated by the participants of the current research. 
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Speaking in the context of child sexual abuse, Smith and Woodhead (1998; p. 
20) stated a simple but important assertion: “Achieving a just outcome requires, at its 
most basic, that…the wrongdoers are identified and made to face the consequences of 
their actions.”  Folger and Cropanzano (2001) believed the central tenet of justice was 
this assignment of blame, and that it was the process of accountability that was a 
fundamental factor in gaining a sense of justice.  In general terms, the authors suggested 
that attributions of blame and responsibility act as moderators of social and moral 
entitlements.   Certainly, as Wong and Weiner (1981) showed, people are likely to 
search for answers regarding another’s behaviour, particularly when that behaviour has 
led to unexpected, negative and important outcomes.  Alicke (2000) stated further that 
people must be held accountable for their actions in order for social order to be 
maintained. 
The idea of primary victims finding vindication through acknowledgement of 
offenders’ guilt is also addressed indirectly in the justice theory literature, most 
noticeably in the research that has investigated forgiveness.  For example, in order to 
develop a theory of apology based on lay people’s interpretation of apologetic 
responses, Slocum, Allan and Allan (2011) conducted a qualitative analysis of 23 
people who had been wronged by an intimate partner.  Of relevance to the current 
research, they found that apology is a process of which one aspect – affirmation – 
involves acknowledgement and admission of the offending behaviour.  This appeared to   
resolve any ambiguity around the actions of the offender, and help bring closure to 
victims as they experienced it as exonerating them from blame.  Such sentiments were 
certainly echoed in the current findings. 
 
Compensation 
 
The vast majority of experimental studies on justice hold the view that there is 
some concrete appeasement possible from a guilty offender to an aggrieved victim 
under any circumstance.  Darley and Pittman (2003) explained that if someone who 
offends against another could have foreseen the harm caused by their actions, then the 
generally accepted view of the relevant literature states that compensation is owed to the 
victim.  In addition, this compensation is apparently determined by the degree of 
physical damage to the victim (Darley & Pittman, 2003).  However, this raises a number 
of questions.  What recourse is there for compensation that is unable to be paid to the 
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victim (for example, if the violent offence committed against them has taken their life)?  
Does the secondary victim then become the focus of compensation?  What occurs when 
there is no objectifiable amount of recompense that can act to satisfy the aggrieved 
parties at all?  Some recent research has sought to answer such questions, and 
investigate the circumstances under which compensatory action occurs.  For example, in 
their analysis of forgiveness, Exline, Worthington, Hill and McCullough (2003) 
outlined a number of factors that might cause offences to be labelled unforgivable, and 
therefore presumably immune to appeasement through compensation.  Firstly, the 
perpetrators may be viewed as unredeemable, and therefore unable to adequate 
compensate for their wrongs.  Secondly, victims may find difficulty in empathising with 
violent offenders and therefore lack the necessary capacity to understand the criminal 
act to a degree they can forgive it.  Lastly, they suggest that feelings of disgust may also 
deter empathic responses, and therefore promote unforgiveness. 
Des Rosiers, Feldthusen and Hankivsky (1998) compared survey results from 
violence victims who received limited government agency compensation, with those 
from victims who pursued civil action, and found that victims generally sought much 
more than simple compensation.  Asking these victims about their motivations and 
experience of justice systems, the authors found that very often the aim was to search 
for a public affirmation of the wrong that they suffered at the hands of another.  
Additionally, as a result of researching compensation as it related specifically to 
monetary outcomes, Okimoto and Tyler (2007) found that many victims viewed fiscal 
compensation as an inadequate response to their victimisation.  This remained the case 
even when their victimisation was unintentional. 
 
Adequacy of Consequences 
 
 As Ashworth (1993) explained, the notion of ordinal proportionality states that 
offences should be ranked according to their relative seriousness, and that seriousness in 
turn is composed of culpability and harmfulness.  The idea of culpability has been 
addressed in a previous section.  The idea of harmfulness will be addressed below. 
Investigations concerned with the perceived harmfulness of crime have often 
focussed on the construct of crime severity (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002).  
This can refer both to the perceived degree of harm caused by an offence, as well as the 
moral wrongfulness of it.  Studies that have used this construct to explore individuals’ 
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motives to punish often illustrate that when unguided by experimental manipulations, 
lay people fit their punishments to the severity of a crime, rather than to any utilitarian 
constructs such as deterrence or incapacitation (e.g., Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 
2000; Warr, Meier & Erickson, 1983).  However, there is also evidence that 
assessments of criminal harm, as it relates to proportionality, cannot be agreed upon, 
even by legal decision makers, whose job it is to apply consequences for it (Raine & 
Dunstan, 2009).  Research into crime severity also broadly explains that whether people 
favour punishment outcomes over restorative ones depends on the variables specific to 
the situation they are judging (Gromet & Darley, 2009).  Specifically, at low levels of 
crime severity, when the intuitive desire to punish a wrongdoer is not strong, people are 
more likely to want to achieve justice through restoration, but when the perceived 
severity of crimes increase, people will be much more inclined to choose retribution 
(Roberts & Stalans, 2004).  This appears particularly true in a forced-choice context 
(Gromet & Darley, 2009). 
 
Perceived Responsibility 
 
The concept of perceived responsibility – particularly as it relates to 
proportionality of punishment – has been addressed in detail in psychological literature.  
It has also been connected to research looking at attribution theory (Heider, 1958).  For 
example, Mikula (2003) focussed on attributions of responsibility and blame as 
mediators and moderators of people’s reactions to perceived violations of entitlements.  
Specifically, he stated that in order for blame to be apportioned, an individual must be 
regarded as being responsible for the violation of entitlements of someone else without 
sufficient justification, and with causality and intention.  In addition, Bies and Shapiro 
(1987) explained that gaining a sense of justice was more likely when there was an 
adequate causal account to justify an unfavourable outcome.   
Fincham and Jaspars (1980) distinguished between different types of 
responsibility, in the context of people attributing it to others.  Specifically, they 
contrasted commonsense notions of responsibility with legal ones.  They stated that 
commonsense ideas of responsibility referred to people being held accountable for the 
results of their own actions, or even the indirect outcomes of these actions.  Legal 
responsibility, however, came about when the outcome of a person’s behaviour was so 
serious that the law was compelled to respond to it on behalf of all others.  
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Subsequently, Montada, Filipp and Lerner (1992) outlined the factors they believed 
related to everyday notions of responsibility, and identified three specifically used by 
people to determine someone’s culpability for a harmful act.  Firstly, there is 
foreseeability, which refers to the perceived normality of behaviour which one can 
reasonably expect from others in particular circumstances.  Secondly, there is 
normativeness, which refers to comparing the degree to which particular harmful 
incidents happen to everyone compared to oneself.  Lastly, there is controllability, 
which refers to fairness assessors’ awareness of risks, and the degree to which a given 
situation was controllable by the parties involved. 
As Alicke (2000) explains, many recent theories of responsibility and blame 
tend to have an emphasis on a series of decision stages through which blame 
attributions proceed.  These include assessments of intent and intent-related behaviour 
leading to harmful consequences as defined by legal systems.  As an alternative, Alicke 
(2000) outlined Culpable Control Theory, which – while it is a decision stage theory – 
is not restricted to legal definitions or dichotomous choices.  Instead, by analysing 
several related threads of research, he postulated that people make assessments of the 
degree of control someone has over their behaviour, and then decide on an associated 
level of culpability.  These decisions are made through a combination of mental, 
behavioural and consequence elements, with judgmental biases acting as a driving 
force, instead of on the periphery as with other theories on attributed responsibility. 
Tetlock and his colleagues (2007) subsequently sought to expand Alicke’s 
(2000) Culpable Control model and Lerner’s (1980) Just World and system-justification 
theories (which essentially state that people can blame a person’s circumstances on 
personal attributes and discount environmental ones, even if they are a victim of wrong-
doing).  In doing so, they used a social functionalist framework (Tetlock, 2002) to 
emphasise the notion of the individual as an intuitive prosecutor.  This approach to 
psychology states at its essence that people will always seek to achieve goals in 
thinking, feeling and acting as they do, and holds three main assumptions.  The first is 
that most people see themselves as ‘fair-minded’ and holding to shared norms of ‘fair-
play’ in their interactions with others.  Secondly, it assumes that because people have 
imperfect cognitive self-control, they will engage in judgmental biases when assessing 
the behaviour of others.  Lastly, this framework assumes that people will try to correct 
themselves when they stray from their own private standards of good judgment.  From 
this social functionalist framework, Tetlock and his colleagues (2007) conducted a 
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series of three experiments, designed to explore determinants of punitive character 
attributions to norm violators.  He found that on some level people view rule breakers as 
being a threat to societal norms, and this in turn activates a prosecutorial mindset 
demonstrated by a correlated group of attributions, emotions, punishment goals and 
punitiveness.  Despite this research providing valuable insight into the dynamic of 
perceived responsibility, much of it presents as abstract reasoning about justice, rather 
than a direct assessment of victims’ views.  As such, it should perhaps be considered as 
a theoretical basis for further, more specific investigation. 
 
Summary 
 
 Generally, the existing psychological literature pertaining to the seven variables 
appears to demonstrate that researchers have noted that these factors are important in 
considerations of justice.  At the very least, they provide a theoretical basis upon which 
to guide an analysis of them as justice decision-making prompts.  Although research 
into some of the variables – for example, voice – have comparatively stronger links to 
the four types of justice described in Stage One than other variables, they all relate to 
the existing literature in some form. 
Importantly, as noted in the main theme of Proportionality, participants made 
individualised and intuitive judgments about whether they felt justice had been achieved 
through a comparison process looking at victim and offender.  Lacking a sense of 
justice was related to perceiving imbalance between these outcomes.  While there are 
clear connections to traditional justice theory in the sense that secondary victims 
compared their outcomes with others and take into account some procedural factors 
while doing so, the specific combination of seven variables used to asses such outcomes 
appears unique to secondary victims.  As such, further investigation was required to 
determine whether evidence of an assessment and comparison process occurs generally 
in secondary victims making judgments of justice.  Understanding the process in greater 
detail has important implications for how the helping professions and facets of the 
criminal justice system respond to such individuals.  Specifically, it is imperative to 
gain knowledge of how potential victims of crime – beyond those who are primary 
victims – understand and attempt to consolidate it into their lives.  This becomes 
important both for professionals responding to their needs, and those having input into 
criminal justice processes, in the context of helping them to cope with the impact of 
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crime and successfully manage related distress.  Therefore, a second stage of research 
was devised in order to develop a more complete picture of the possible justice 
experiences and perceptions of potential secondary victims of violent crime. 
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STAGE TWO 
 
As noted in the subthemes encapsulated by the main theme of Proportionality in 
Stage One, participants considered various aspects of the primary victims’ and 
offenders’ experiences when making determinations of the balance between victim and 
offender outcomes.  Some of these considerations appeared to have only indirect 
connections to the four main existing theories of justice.  To reiterate, the aspects of 
victimisation were: the degree of physical suffering experienced by the primary victim, 
the perceived degree of psychological suffering experienced by the primary victim, 
whether the primary victims’ views were heard by the criminal justice system, whether 
the offender’s culpability was acknowledged by the criminal justice system, the degree 
to which the consequences to the offender compensated for their actions, whether the 
consequences to the offender were seen as adequate, and the degree to which the 
offender was seen as being responsible for the victim’s suffering.  These seven 
identified concepts, used by many secondary victims to compare victim-offender 
outcomes, constituted preliminary findings at the first stage of research.  As such, they 
lent themselves to more detailed investigation.  Therefore, a second stage of research 
was conducted with three related aims: Firstly, to elucidate the identified assessment 
and comparison process more clearly, secondly, to thus provide a more comprehensive 
picture of how potential secondary victims of violent crime might experience and 
perceive justice beyond the explanations of existing justice theories, and thirdly, to 
determine if the use of the seven identified concepts was a finding that was unique to 
Stage One participants, or if further evidence of it could be found in a larger population 
sample of theoretical secondary victims.  Similar to the first stage of research, the 
rationale for these aims was also that expanding the knowledge about how people 
experiencing secondary victimisation might perceive justice may help forensic 
psychologists to mitigate the breadth and depth of adverse psychological consequences 
from such victimisation.  Additionally, if the dynamics of secondary victimisation are 
better understood, forensic psychologists can tailor interventions to meet their particular 
needs.  
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Research questions 
 
Specifically, there were two primary research questions for Stage Two.  Firstly, 
do people, acting in the role of secondary victims, perceive injustice through the 
perception of imbalanced victim-offender outcomes?  Secondly, to what degree do 
potential secondary victims consider the same particular variables in deciding 
imbalanced victim-offender outcomes as participants in Stage One? 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were a group of 156 self-volunteered people who responded to a 
request for research participants to act in the role of a secondary victim.  Of the 156 
participants, 55.8% were male (n=87), and 40.4% were female (n=63), and 3.8% of 
participants did not indicate either sex (n=6).  All age groups were well represented, 
with 23.1% (n=36) of participants aged 18 to 25 years old, 26.9% (n=42) aged 26 to 35 
years old, 12.2% (n=19) aged 36 to 45 years old, 22.4% (n=35) aged 46 to 60 years old, 
and 16.0% (n=25) aged over 60 years old. 
Participants were recruited through social and professional networks.  This 
consisted of placing the questionnaires in an accessible place within various 
workplaces.  A note requesting volunteer participants was placed next to the 
questionnaires.  As the instructions to the questionnaire were clearly marked at the top 
of the questionnaire, potential participants could agree to fill out the document and 
return it to the researcher via pre-paid envelope, in order to indicate their consent.  
Approval was given for potential participants to give their consent in this manner, as 
well as providing information about the questionnaire on the form itself, by the Edith 
Cowan University Ethics Committee. 
Despite no effort being made to screen them out, actual secondary victims were 
not sought for this stage of the research for two related reasons.  Firstly, difficulties in 
recruiting secondary victims for the first stage of research were noted, and this was 
expected to remain a problematic issue.  Secondly, because a quantitative approach was 
taken, a much larger group of participants than the first stage of research was needed.  It 
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was considered unlikely that a sample of secondary victims large enough to conduct 
quantitative analysis could be recruited. 
One benefit of participants providing responses after being exposed to an 
identical scenario was that it served to standardise the stimulus they used to make 
judgments about justice.  Assuming that the same underlying decision-making processes 
were involved as the participants in Stage One, it was hoped that participants would use 
empathy to prompt thoughts about how they might experience such victimisation.  
Avoiding the use of actual secondary victims as participants was also employed to 
maintain an objective approach and make the resultant findings applicable to potential 
secondary victims. 
 
Materials/Procedure 
 
Participants responded anonymously to a questionnaire (Appendix G) and 
indicated their consent to participate in the study by returning it to the author in a 
prepaid envelope provided.  The questionnaire consisted of both sides of an A4 sheet of 
paper.  On the front, the nature of the research was firstly explained, and participants 
were asked to tick boxes to indicate their age range and gender.  They were then asked 
to read the following scenario: 
 
John, a 23 year old man, was physically assaulted by a 27 year old man armed with an 
iron bar, while walking home from finishing shift work late at night.  When the offender 
was arrested after a period of several months, he was unwilling to provide a statement 
to police.  John sustained significant injuries, required extended hospitalisation, and 
was in a coma for several weeks.  He was left with several noticeable scars to his face 
and body, and had short-term memory loss that was not present before the assault.  
Although considered by his partner as a man well able to withstand emotional 
difficulties, John was traumatised by the event, and required long-term counselling.  He 
reported to his GP that he had trouble sleeping, and was prescribed medication.  He 
also became generally more anxious.  The offender was charged with attempted 
murder.  However, the prosecutor of the case chose to accept his guilty plea on the 
lesser charge of grievous bodily harm, because he felt he would not be able to prove the 
offender’s intent to murder John.  During the trial, John’s partner wanted to provide a 
Victim Impact Statement on behalf of John, but was told she was not able to do so.  
John was also told by his lawyer that despite his desire to testify, he was not required to 
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because the offender had pled guilty.  The offender eventually received a sentence of 
five years imprisonment.  He served a total of two years and nine months, and was then 
released to the community on parole.  The offender also received a criminal record as a 
result of his imprisonment. 
 
This scenario was designed to present a situation where the outcomes of the 
primary victim and offender are imbalanced, based on a combination of experiences of 
secondary victims from Stage One.  It was also designed to incorporate representations 
of each of the seven subthemes identified from Stage One, and to provide enough 
information relating to each for participants to be able to make a determination about 
the degree to which they took these seven variables into account.   
The participants were then asked to respond to the question “Do you believe that 
justice was achieved for John in this circumstance?” by indicating their opinion on a 7-
point Likert-type scale.  It was assumed that the majority of participants would judge 
that justice was not achieved for the character of John.  This was important because the 
results of the research relied on participants feeling a sense of injustice, and making 
their judgements based on that feeling.  Nevertheless, the scenario was based in reality 
where feasible, so as not create an unbelievable set of circumstances.  This was done to 
avoid leading the participants into judging the scenario as egregiously unfair, and thus 
avoid possible bias as a result.  Therefore, the scenario was designed to elicit a response 
from participants whereby they would judge the scenario as being unjust, but allow 
individual differences in the degree to which they assessed it as such.  This was done in 
order to encourage participants to consider the variables they used to determine if 
justice had been achieved for the person in the scenario. 
Participants were then asked to what degree they considered each of the 
identified seven variables, in determining whether they thought victim and offender 
circumstances were balanced in the given scenario.  They did so by recording their 
response on a 7-point Likert scale.  The seven questionnaire items were as follows: 
 
 
1. I considered the physical suffering John experienced. 
2. I considered the psychological suffering John experienced. 
3. I considered whether John’s views were heard by the legal system. 
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4. I considered whether the legal system sufficiently acknowledged the offender’s 
responsibility. 
5. I considered the degree to which what happened to the offender made up for his 
actions towards John. 
6. I considered whether the consequences to the offender were adequate. 
7. I considered the degree to which the offender was responsible for John’s 
suffering. 
 
The items were randomly ordered for each questionnaire, in order to combat 
response bias. 
 
Results 
 
Concerning the first question, regarding the perception of participants that 
justice had been done in the scenario provided to them, a total of 83.9% (n = 131) of 
them said that it had not.  This context was crucial for participants’ responses, and 
suggests that the scenario provided did in fact prime them to perceive that victim-
offender outcomes were imbalanced in favour of the offender.  In some cases, this was 
manifested in a strong disagreement that justice had been done.  Specifically, 17.9% (n 
= 28) of participants responded this way. 
However, 13.5% (n = 21) of participants believed that justice had in fact been 
achieved, while 2.6% (n = 4) could neither agree nor disagree.  No effort was made to 
exclude these participants, because analysing their responses would allow an 
opportunity to compare them to participants who had not perceived justice.  This in turn 
could highlight possible future areas of required research. 
Table 2 illustrates the means and standard deviations, with Strongly Agree equal 
to a value of seven, through to Strongly Disagree with a value of one, of the participants 
who perceived injustice in the scenario.  The Table demonstrates that the participants 
who perceived injustice in the scenario, reported that they considered the seven 
variables identified in Stage One.  The mode for all variables was agree.  There was a 
particularly strong response regarding the variables relating to the degree of physical 
suffering the victim sustained, as well as the perceived adequacy of consequences.  For 
these particular variables, the next most likely response by participants, after agree, was 
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strongly agree, making up a total of 87.1% and 78.6% of responses, respectively.  For 
all other variables, participants’ next most likely response after agree was slightly 
 
Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Seven Comparison Variables among Participants who 
Perceived Injustice 
 
 
 
Variables   Mean    Standard deviation 
 
        
 
Physical suffering 
 
 
  
6.13 
   
0.85 
  
Adequacy of 
Consequences 
 
 5.94   1.14   
Degree of offender 
responsibility 
 
 
 5.94   0.99   
Psychological 
Suffering 
 
 5.79   1.17   
Compensation by 
offender 
 5.37   1.47   
Acknowledgement  
of culpability 
 
 5.24   1.38   
Views heard 
 
. 
 5.11   1.49   
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agree.  However, participants who perceived justice had been served in the scenario 
provided also agreed that they used the seven variables when comparing outcomes.  
Furthermore, they did so to much the same degree as those who had perceived injustice.  
The mode for all variables considered by those participants was also ‘agree’ (see Table 
3. 
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Table 3 
 
Frequency statistics for the Seven Comparison Variables among Participants who 
Perceived Injustice 
 
 
Factors           Likert-item responses 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Slightly 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
 
Physical suffering 
 
 
 
32.1% 
 
 
55.0% 
 
 
10.7% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
0.8%  
 
1.5% 
 
 
0% 
 
Adequacy of 
Consequences 
 
30.5%  48.1% 
 
14.5% 
 
2.3% 
 
0.8% 
 
3.1% 
 
0.8% 
 
Views heard 
 
 
13.7% 
 
36.6% 
 
27.5% 
 
4.6% 
 
7.6%  9.9% 
 
0% 
 
Psychological 
Suffering 
 
22.1% 
 
51.1% 
 
19.1% 
 
1.5% 
 
2.3% 
 
3.8% 
 
0% 
 
Accountability and 
Acknowledgement  
of responsibility 
13.7% 
 
40.5% 
 
26.7% 
 
4.6% 
 
8.4%  6.1% 
 
0% 
 
Compensation by 
offender 
 
17.6% 
 
46.6% 
 
16.8% 
 
4.6% 
 
6.1% 
 
7.6% 
 
0.8% 
 
Degree of 
offender 
responsibility 
29.0% 
 
46.6% 
 
18.3% 
 
3.1%  1.5%  1.5% 
 
0% 
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Sorting participants responses into the categories of agree or disagree, 
irrespective of perceived justice, and discarding the responses of participants who 
endorsed neither agree nor disagree, the disparity between those who disagreed they 
had used the particular comparison variables and those who had not, became more 
obvious (see Table 4). 
The variables most endorsed by all participants appeared to be consideration of 
the primary victim’s physical (M = 6.04, SD 0.89; n = 156) and psychological suffering 
(M = 5.74, SD 1.14; n = 156), the degree of offender responsibility (M = 5.75, SD 1.16; 
n = 156), and the perceived adequacy of consequences to the offender (M = 5.89, SD 
1.10; n = 156).  Also, although the remaining three aspects of victimisation were not 
endorsed as readily by participants (whether the victim’s views were heard, whether the 
offender compensated for their actions, and whether the justice system acknowledged 
the offender’s culpability), over three quarters of participants agreed that they 
considered such variables when comparing victim-offender outcomes. 
Lastly, the variables which participants least frequently endorsed were: whether 
John’s views were heard by the legal system (M = 5.10, SD 1.49; n = 156), whether the 
legal system sufficiently acknowledged the offender’s culpability (M = 5.24, SD 1.37; n 
= 156), and the degree to which what happened to the offender made up for his actions 
towards John (M = 5.24, SD 1.51; n = 156). 
  85
Table 4 
 
Distribution to the Comparison Variables (N = 156) 
 
 
Variables                      Agree (%)                 Disagree (%) 
 
 
 
Physical suffering    96.8   3.2 
 
    
Adequacy of     92.9   3.8 
consequences      
 
 
Views heard     77.6   10.6 
       
 
Psychological     91.0   6.4 
suffering      
 
 
Acknowledgement     80.1   15.4 
of culpability 
    
 
Compensation by offender   77.6   17.9 
       
 
Degree of     89.1   5.1 
offender        
responsibility 
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Discussion 
 
The results of the second stage of data collection showed that participants acting 
in the role of secondary victims took into consideration the seven aspects of 
victimisation identified in the first stage of research when making assessments of 
imbalanced victim and offender outcomes.  This gives further weight to the evidence 
that these variables may be used by people as justice decision-making prompts.  The 
results also indicated more broadly that these comparison variables appear to be 
independent of justice perceptions, as results showed that participants endorsed all 
seven to some degree when assessing victim and offender outcomes, whether or not 
they perceived justice had been achieved in the scenario provided.  This suggests that it 
cannot be assumed that a sense of injustice is inevitably created from observers’ 
perceptions of imbalanced outcomes.  Rather, it appears that the comparison process 
itself may be prompted simply through the role of being a secondary victim, and is 
separate from subsequent judgments of justice. 
Overall, the results showed strong support for the use of the identified variables.  
In particular, the most endorsed variables appeared to be consideration of the primary 
victim’s physical and psychological suffering, the degree of offender responsibility, and 
the perceived adequacy of consequences to the offender.  This seems to suggest that 
participants may have focussed on aspects of victimisation which did not require 
complex cognitive resources.  For example, the physical and psychological impact of 
the victimisation on the primary victim may have been easy to assess from the scenario 
provided.  Similarly, a determination of how much the offender was responsible, and 
whether their punishment was adequate, may also have been an easy judgment for 
participants to make. 
In comparison to these variables, the remaining variables endorsed by 
participants (whether the victim’s views were heard, whether the offender compensated 
for their actions, and whether the justice system acknowledged the offender’s 
culpability) may have required a greater level of consideration, and therefore may not 
have been as easily assessed by participants.  Such a finding also reinforces that some 
participants may have focussed less on the procedural aspects of the justice system in 
making their assessments, and comparatively more on aspects relating to outcomes.  
This is because these three variables all relate specifically to mechanisms in the criminal 
justice system, and how decisions are arrived at, rather than the outcomes of the 
decisions themselves.  For example, whether the legal system sufficiently 
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acknowledged the offender’s culpability (a process) seemed to be less of a concern to 
some participants than whether the consequences dealt to the offender were adequate 
(an outcome).   
Generally, the finding that people accessed the given variables using apparently 
simple cognitive resources suggests that people may use intuitive processes when 
deciding if justice has been achieved in their circumstance.  This is important because it 
appears to link into the idea of implicit ideas of justice, only briefly addressed in 
existing literature.  For example, as Furby (1986) argued, a comparatively large amount 
of justice research has typically focussed on what rules and criteria are endorsed by 
victims, and there has been virtually no effort to directly investigate implicit definitions 
of justice.  She states that this is partly due to the idea of justice being a highly personal 
one, which differs from person to person depending on their experiences of the world.  
This idea also incorporates the notion that for some people, if they do not perceive 
balance in victim-offender outcomes, they are unable to achieve a sense of justice, and 
feel that justice cannot be achieved in their circumstance.  Such perceived 
unachieveability of justice has implications for justice theory research, as all existing 
theories appear to make the core assumption that a sense of justice is possible for all, in 
any given circumstance, provided that certain criteria are met.  The findings from the 
current project do not support this assumption.  For some people, their experience of 
perceived injustice is clearly so great that they cannot conceptualise either a scenario, or 
set of criteria, that enables them to feel that justice has been achieved.  In fact, the idea 
that injustice may sometimes be inevitable is a seemingly logical one due to the fact that 
it may be sometimes impossible to simultaneously satisfy the desired outcomes of 
separate individuals.  This concept has certainly been considered before.  For example, 
in discussing human behaviour in the context of decision making and the dynamics of 
judgment, Hammond (1996; p.59) explained that because predictive matrices are 
fundamentally imperfect, then this “irreducible uncertainty inevitably results in error, 
and… injustice is thus unavoidable.”  Also, speaking as a moral philosopher, Sowell 
(1999) coined the term ‘cosmic justice’ in order to describe an unachievable ideal of 
having perfectly allocated outcomes for all.  Such a notion seems to suggest that 
secondary victims’ ability to achieve closure may depend on their ability to successfully 
tolerate justice imperfections. 
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Another important finding of Stage Two was that some participants agreed that 
justice had been achieved for the primary victim in the scenario provided.  Although the 
aim was to create a scenario that encouraged participants to view the experience of the 
primary victim as unjust, it was based in reality where feasible, so as not create an 
unbelievable set of circumstances.  Although this was done to avoid leading the 
participants into judging the scenario as egregiously unfair, over 13% of participants 
nevertheless maintained that justice had been achieved.  This appears to highlight the 
uniqueness of peoples’ perceptions of justice. 
 
Methodological Limitations 
 
Several methodological limitations arose from the research process that require 
discussion. 
Firstly, due to the fact that actual secondary victims were not accessed for the 
second stage of research, the ability to generalise the results to such a population is 
somewhat restricted.  For example, it is possible that some of the participants may have 
considered themselves secondary victims of non-sexual violent crime, independent to 
the current research, but no information was gathered relating specifically to this.  
However, while the use of participants who were not necessarily secondary victims was 
not ideal, there is a raft of existing research which has used a similar population in order 
to draw solid conclusions about justice (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; 
Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 2000; Tyler, 1986; Warr, Meier, & Erickson, 1983). 
Secondly, admitting previously excluded categories of secondary victims in 
Stage One, such as those where the primary victim was murdered or was assaulted in a 
domestic violence context, produced several participants in these categories that formed 
part of the final population sample.  It is possible that these particular participants 
created a skewing of responses towards strongly held views and rigid conceptualisations 
of justice based on more purely emotional motivation.  Although this suggests that the 
sample might not have been representative of secondary victims in general, it 
nevertheless highlights concerns that are significant for some of the target population 
and that may not have otherwise been brought to light. 
Thirdly, the tendency of Stage Two participants to agree with the stated 
variables may have been due in part to an acquiescence bias, as none of the Likert items 
were worded negatively.  Nevertheless, research has shown that negatively wording 
questionnaire items also has the capacity to create systematic errors as individuals may 
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react differently to positive and negative items (Friborg, Martinussen, & Rosenvinge, 
2006). 
Fourthly, it is also important to note that first stage participants’ perceptions of 
justice, brought about by victim-offender comparisons, varied based on the practical and 
psychological resources they expended.  Due to the fact that participants in the second 
stage did not share an actual bond with the victim in the scenario, this dynamic may not 
have been operating.  It may be that this difference could have affected the process by 
which these participants compared outcomes.  Also, assuming that the majority of 
participants were not actually secondary victims, the emotional component noted in the 
responses of the first stage participants was not likely to have been present in the second 
stage sample.  This is because participants were asked to imagine themselves in the role 
of a secondary victim, rather than experiencing such victimisation directly.  However, 
as noted, the use of potential secondary victims, rather than actual secondary victims, 
was a strength of the Stage Two research as it allowed for objectivity. 
Lastly, although the results indicated that no one comparison variable was 
endorsed strongly over the others, the variable which was most endorsed by participants 
was that of the perceived physical suffering of the victim.  As noted, it may be that this 
is because it was seen by the participants as a tangible concept and perhaps therefore 
less cognitively taxing to make a judgement on than the other variables.  However, 
because it could be considered as less abstract that the other variables, participants may 
have relied on it to inform the majority of their outcome assessment.  Related to this, 
clarification is also required in relation to the variables themselves.  Some of the 
variables incorporate overlapping concepts, and it could easily be argued that they are 
not discrete ideas.  For example, the perceived adequacy of consequences to the 
offender might have been viewed by some participants as being related to the degree to 
which the offender was held accountable for their actions.  This is because recognition 
of offender culpability was shown in the first stage results to be a kind of consequence 
that some participants wanted the justice system to provide.  The possible overlapping 
of variables therefore suggests that the mechanisms participants used in determining 
their response to one variable may also have been employed for determining their 
response to another.  This may have impacted on participants’ judgments and 
confounded the results.  Such overlap has been noted in other justice theory research.  
For example, this issue was identified in Leventhal’s Rules of Justice (1980) by Lind 
and Tyler (1988), and it is possible that a similar dynamic was occurring in the current 
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research.  However, the degree to which there was overlap – if any – is unclear, and 
may not have negated the results at all. 
Despite the limitations of Stage Two, the results nevertheless appeared to lend 
support to the use of the seven variables identified in Stage One.  The presence of the 
comparison dynamic, and associated use of specific variables to assess victim-offender 
outcomes, is an important finding because demonstrates what concepts are related to 
secondary victims achieving a sense of justice. 
 
Future Directions 
 
The results of this research project highlighted a number of areas that require 
further investigation. 
Firstly, more research is needed on emotion as an outcome variable in secondary 
victims’ experiences of justice.  This could ideally focus on either emotional responses 
independent of any particular theory of justice, or the potential for certain procedures, 
outcomes, or other specific justice theory components to affect emotional responses. 
Secondly, the impact of secondary victims’ pre-existing views of justice should 
be taken into account in subsequent research on this population.  The results of this 
research may have been affected by secondary victim participants existing experiences 
of the criminal justice system.  As such, it is possible that they may have searched for 
confirmatory evidence to support their pre-existing views, or faced cognitive 
dissonance.  Each of these scenarios has important implications for how secondary 
victims experience justice and therefore require further analysis. 
Thirdly, the findings relating to the closeness of relationship between primary 
and secondary victims and perceptions of justice need to be investigated in greater 
detail.  This is also the case with the findings demonstrating a relationship between the 
type of victimisation experienced by the primary victim, and the secondary victims’ 
subsequent perception of justice.  Both of these findings have important clinical 
implications relating to how practitioners assist secondary victims in managing their 
own experience of victimisation. 
Fourthly, the finding that people possess implicit theories of justice that may not 
link readily to existing theories is one that needs further investigation.  Specifically, 
more information is needed about the implications of individual conceptualisations of 
justice for how people react to, interpret and consolidate injustice.  This is crucial to 
understand how some secondary victims are not able to achieve a sense of justice at all, 
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or at least without great difficulty.  Such results highlight related clinical implications, 
such as how best to approach secondary victims’ feelings of helplessness and lack of 
psychological restoration, in order to help them manage their own distress associated 
with victimisation. 
Additionally, the seven variables identified require clarification of their 
existence as justice decision-making prompts.  In particular, additional focus is needed 
on the degree to which the variables are discrete, and if they point to an intuitive 
approach to justice perceptions.  Furthermore, an area that should be further investigated 
is determining the preferences of secondary victims as to the possible ordering of the 
variables identified, in their assessments of imbalanced outcomes.  It is not safe to 
assume that the variables each have equal weighting, and therefore a more analysis 
could clarify to what degree the individual variables account for a total sense of justice 
in a separate set of participants.  Lastly, more research is required to investigate the role 
of emotions in victim-offender outcome comparisons, and how they relate to the seven 
identified variables. 
 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis attempted to illuminate the degree to which existing theories of 
justice could account for the perceptions of secondary victims of non-sexual violent 
crime.  The first stage of research demonstrated that these theories were endorsed by 
secondary victims to some degree.  Broadly speaking, elements of distributive justice 
theory were most evident in the main theme of Proportionality, elements of procedural 
justice theory were related to the themes of Secondary Victim Utility and 
Proportionality, and retributive and restorative principles were most directly linked to 
the theme of Punishment Goals.  However, justice theories did not fully explain 
secondary victims’ experiences.  Instead, a complex and nuanced picture emerged. 
In summary, secondary victims appear to experience an emotional response to 
victimisation, the intensity of which increased proportionally to the closeness of the 
individual secondary victim’s relationship with the primary victim as well as the 
severity of the type of crime committed by the offender.  This emotional response then 
typically prompted them to assess their circumstances, and those of the primary victim, 
and begin to seek justice through a number of mechanisms.  Some secondary victims 
saw justice as being achieved through their actions as the primary victim’s advocate, or 
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through acting as a facilitator of justice for their loved one.  Secondary victims also 
endorsed the punishment goals of deterrence, vengeance, rehabilitation and 
compensation.  They also found justice to be reflected in the formal recognition of the 
primary victim’s experience – and to a lesser extent, their own – and typically looked 
for this process to be provided through the legal system.  This could include recognition 
of a specific offender, that offender’s guilt, their culpability, and the fact that a legal 
response to their actions was necessary.  Many participants appeared to make 
individualised and intuitive judgements about whether justice had been achieved, which 
were dependent upon their comparisons of the outcomes of, the victim and the offender.  
The comparisons made by secondary victims of the perceived fairness of the outcomes 
to the perpetrator compared to those of the primary victim were made through 
considerations of seven distinct variables relating to the offender and primary victim.  
Three of these factors related to the primary victim (physical and psychological impact 
of the crime, and voice), and four related to the offender (whether the offender’s 
culpability was formally recognised, the perceived degree to which the consequences to 
the offender compensated for their actions, the perceived adequacy of consequences 
meted out to the offender, and the perceived responsibility of the offender).  The 
comparison process engaged in by many Stage One participants appeared to be 
independent of whether or not participants believed justice had been achieved in a given 
circumstance, giving weight to the evidence that these variables may be used as justice 
decision-making prompts generally. 
This research also uncovered unique elements of secondary victims’ experiences 
which were not fully explained by existing theories of justice.  These included: the role 
of emotions, both as a response to victimisation, and as a prompt for secondary victims 
to assess their circumstances and compare primary victim and offender outcomes; the 
role of the secondary victim as an actively involved third party, engaging in direct 
advocacy or helping the primary victim through means such as empowerment; the idea 
of implicit ideas of justice – intuitive conceptualisations of justice based on individuals’ 
experiences, and the implications of the unachieveability of justice, where peoples’ 
experiences of injustice are so great, that they cannot conceptualise a scenario whereby 
justice can be achieved for them. 
Overall, the findings of the two stages of research represent an important step 
towards a more comprehensive understanding of the justice experiences and perceptions 
of secondary victims of violent crime.  This will have particularly useful applications to 
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victim support groups, psychotherapists and forensic psychology as a whole.  For 
example, the relationships between primary and secondary victims should be clearly 
taken into account when treating either group, as these studies show they have the 
capacity to impact on each other significantly.  Victim support agencies may also find 
utility in incorporating some of the insights evident in this research as part of 
information they offer to secondary victims, such as the role of emotions and assisting 
them to understand some of the mechanisms involved in their own victimisation.  
Forensic psychologists may also benefit from gaining a more comprehensive 
understanding of the dynamics of secondary victimisation elucidated by this research, 
and perhaps incorporate such understanding into their treatment approaches.  
Specifically, knowledge of what aspects of victimisation are particularly important to 
secondary victims may inform their recovery from trauma.  Additionally, there may also 
be implications from this research for the criminal justice system.  For example, it is 
likely to be beneficial for secondary victims to be kept informed by authorities and for 
them to be accommodated more readily to focus on maximising positive outcomes for 
victims.  This is crucial in light of secondary victims’ keenness to assist primary victims 
with procedural factors.  In any event, continued investigation into the experiences and 
perceptions of secondary victims is clearly necessary to further clarify their 
understanding of justice and therefore assist in responding to their needs. 
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Appendix A 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Thank you for responding to the invitation to participate in this study.  My name is Ben 
Bannister and I am a Doctor of Forensic Psychology student at Edith Cowan University.  The 
study I am inviting you to participate in today, examines the emotions people experience if a 
relative or friend is the victim of a serious crime and how they perceive the process that follows 
such an incident.  This is part of a larger study that a research team of staff members and 
students of Edith Cowan University is undertaking. 
 
We hope to use the findings of this study to inform the general public, therapists and the justice 
system of the experiences of secondary victims. 
 
Today I will be specifically asking you to give me information about 
• yourself and the victim; 
• the offender, if known, the offence and what happened to the case if there was one; 
• the psychological and medical effect this incident had on you and the victim; 
• the court case if there was one;  
• and other traumas you may have experienced recently. 
  
I will then ask you to tell me your feelings and what you did after the incident.  There is a 
possibility that you may feel upset by talking about this and therefore your participation is 
voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without any penalty.  The data that has been 
collected will be destroyed if you withdraw from the project.   
 
This session should take about 45 minutes. 
 
The study conforms to guidelines produced by the Edith Cowan University Committee for the 
Conduct of Ethical Research and has been approved by the Ethics Committee at Edith Cowan 
University.   
 
Any information that you provide will be held in strict confidence by the research team. Your 
name will not appear on any document and no member other than I will know your name. I will 
use the information you provide to write a thesis, and it may also be used in articles for 
publication in scientific journals, and a media release.  The media release will be an attempt to 
give you and other participants an opportunity to read what the findings of the research team 
were.   
 
Any questions concerning this study can be directed to myself, Ben Bannister, on (08) 9411 
5490, Dr Dianne McKillop on (08) 6304 5736 (Supervisor) or Professor Alison Garton on (08) 
6304 5110 who is independent of the project.  
 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
Please retain this information sheet for your own records 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
(Kept separate from the completed questionnaires) 
 
 
I _______________________________________ confirm that: 
 
• I have read the information sheet that forms part of this document  
• I was given an opportunity to ask questions 
• All my questions were satisfactorily answered 
• I understand this information 
• No pressure is being put on me to participate and I realise that I can withdraw at any time 
• I agree that research gathered for the study may be published, provided I am not identifiable, 
and 
• I voluntarily sign the consent 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________________            __________________ 
  Participant      Date  
 
 
 
___________________________________________           __________________ 
 Investigator Date 
 
  109
Appendix C 
 
Counselling support services 
 
Below is a list of counselling services available to West Australians who have 
experienced, or are experiencing, difficulties in their lives.  Please call one of the 
numbers if you feel that you are having trouble coping, or simply need someone to talk 
to. 
 
 
Victim Support Services 
Freecall – 1800 818 988 
 
 
Lifeline 
Freecall – 13 11 14 
 
 
"Someone to talk to"  
Freecall –1902 22 1902  
 
 
Salvo Careline  
Telephone – (02) 9331 6000  
 
 
Salvo Suicide Prevention Line  
Freecall – 1300 36 36 22 
 
 
Alternatively, if you wish to make an appointment with a Registered Psychologist, 
please contact  
 
The APS Psychologist Referral Service  
Freecall – 1800 333 497 
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Appendix E 
 
Structured interview (Part 1) 
 
Unique identifier 
 
              
F L       d d m m y y 
Participant Interviewer code Date of the incident4 
 
1. Information about participant 
 
Gender       F   
  M   
 
Age in years (round to the closest full year)     
 
Age at time of incident       
 
Have you received any psychiatric diagnosis: 
a) prior to the incident?    Yes 
 No 
(If yes, provide details)  
 
b) since the incident?    Yes 
 No 
(If yes, provide details)  
 
Have you undergone any treatment or therapy since the incident? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Are you currently undergoing any treatment or therapy? 
 Yes 
 No 
If the answer is yes, consider whether it is appropriate to proceed with interview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End of part 1. 
Structured interview (Part 2) 
 
2. Information about victim (Do not record the name of the victim) 
 
Gender       F   
 M    
 
Age in years (round to the closest full year)     
 
Age at time of incident       
 
 
 
 
Has the victim undergone any treatment or therapy since the incident? 
 Yes 
                                                          
4
 Give the date the offence stopped if it was something that took place over a period of time. 
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 No 
 
 
3. Relationship between participant and victim.  I am the victim’s: 
 
Biological mother       
Stepmother         
De facto mother         
Female guardian        
Biological father        
Stepfather        
De facto father        
Male guardian        
Brother         
Sister         
Spouse         
Male partner         
Female partner         
Daughter         
Son         
Grandmother         
Grandfather         
Male friend         
Female friend         
Other          
(Specify)  
 
 
Did victim live/share a house with you at time of incident?   Yes  
 No 
         Other 
(Specify)  
 
4. Offender 
 
The offender was known to me      Yes 
       No 
         Uncertain 
 
The victim knew the offender       Yes 
       No 
         Uncertain 
 
Estimated age of offender        
 
 
5. Nature of offence 
 
Attempted murder        
 
Assault          
Assault with an object        
 
Rape5 (penetration without consent)     
(Specify)  
 
Penetration involving person U16      
(Specify)  
                                                          
5
 All cases where there was penetration except those where the relationship was consensual but the victim 
was younger than 16, in which case penetration under 16 must be ticked.  
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Indecent acts involving sexual behaviour     
(Specify)  
 
Other sexual offence        
(Specify)  
 
Robbery involving threats of violence     
Robbery involving a weapon        
 
Kidnapping/abduction       
 
 
Was the victim injured?       Yes  
 No  
(If yes, give a short description)  
 
Sequelae  
 
Did the victim require medical treatment?     Yes 
  No 
 
Did the victim require counselling?      Yes  
 No  
 
Did you require medical treatment?      Yes 
  No 
 
Did you require counselling?      Yes 
 No 
 
Did anyone else in the victim’s family require medical treatment?  
 Yes 
 No 
(If yes, specify who)  
 
Was the crime reported to the police     Yes 
 No   
Was the complaint withdrawn      Yes 
 No 
Was the offender arrested       Yes 
 No 
Was there a court case       Yes 
  No 
The accused was        Acquitted 
 Convicted   
 
Can you tell me why the crime was/not reported to the police? 
Can you tell me why the complaint was withdrawn/ pursued?  
 
6. Did you attend the court case?    Yes  
 No 
 There was no court case 
 
7. If you did not attend the court case/ If you attended the court case   
Can you explain why you made this decision?  
Can you tell me how it made you feel?   
  114 
Can you tell me how you feel about your decision today?  
If you could turn the clock back, would you make the same decision?  
 
8. Victim impact statement  
Can you explain to me what you think a victim impact statement is? 
Was a victim impact statement offered?    Yes 
        No 
        Do not know what a VIS is 
If yes or no, can you explain this decision?  
Who made the decision?  
How do you feel about the decision?  
 
9. Did you testify?      
 Yes  
 No 
 There was no court case 
If you testified, can you tell me how that made you feel?  
If you did not testify, would you have liked an opportunity to testify?  
 Yes  
 No 
Can you explain why?  
 
10. If there was no court case 
Would you have attended the case if there was one    Yes  
(forced choice question)      No 
Can you explain why?  
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Appendix F 
 
Unstructured interview prompt questions 
 
 
 What happened in your case? 
 What outcome did you want for the offender? 
 Were you satisfied with your level of involvement in the case? 
 What does justice mean to you? 
 For whom has justice been achieved in this case? 
 What did you feel needed to have occurred to feel that justice had been done? 
 Was your relationship to (victim) affected in any way? 
 How do you feel about (offender)? 
 What was your experience of the justice system? 
 Have your ideas of justice changed as a result of the incident? 
 What’s the most important thing as far as getting justice done is concerned? 
 What was your experience of what happened? 
 How did you feel about what happened? 
 How do you feel about the outcome to the victim? 
 How do you feel about the outcome to the offender? 
 Was there a court case? 
 How did you feel about that? 
 If not, how did you feel about there not being a court case? 
 Is there anything you want to tell me that I haven’t asked you about? 
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Thank you very much for taking time to complete this short, anonymous questionnaire.  It should take about 5 
minutes.  Please ensure that you do not write your name (or any other comments that could identify you) on the 
questionnaire.  By completing the questionnaire, you are consenting to take part in this research.  It is designed 
to create an understanding of individuals’ perceptions of justice, and is concerned with the variables people use 
to determine if justice has been achieved for others.  It also has the approval of the Ethics Committee at Edith 
Cowan University. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please tick the appropriate box for the following information. 
 
Your age:   18-25             26-35         36-45           46-60            60+  
Sex:  Male                 Female 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Now, please read the scenario below. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
John, a 23 year old man, was physically assaulted by a 27 year old man armed with an iron bar, while 
walking home from finishing shift work late at night.  When the offender was arrested after a period of 
several months, he was unwilling to provide a statement to police. 
 
John sustained significant injuries, required extended hospitalisation, and was in a coma for several weeks.  
He was left with several noticeable scars to his face and body, and had short-term memory loss that was not 
present before the assault. 
 
Although considered by his partner as a man well able to withstand emotional difficulties, John was 
traumatised by the event, and required long-term counselling.  He reported to his GP that he had trouble 
sleeping, and was prescribed medication.  He also became generally more anxious. 
 
The offender was charged with attempted murder.  However, the prosecutor of the case chose to accept his 
guilty plea on the lesser charge of grievous bodily harm, because he felt he would not be able to prove the 
offender’s intent to murder John.  During the trial, John’s partner wanted to provide a Victim Impact 
Statement on behalf of John, but was told she was not able to do so.  John was also told by his lawyer that 
despite his desire to testify, he was not required to because the offender had pled guilty. 
 
The offender eventually received a sentence of five years imprisonment.  He served a total of two years and 
nine months, and was then released to the community on parole.  The offender also received a criminal 
record as a result of his imprisonment. 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please circle the number that reflects your response to the statement below. 
Justice was achieved for John in this scenario. 
 
Strongly agree       Agree        Slightly agree       Neither agree     Slightly disagree     Disagree        Strongly disagree 
                                                                               nor disagree 
           1                    2                       3                            4                          5                        6                           7 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
PLEASE TURN OVER
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Now, imagine you are a close friend or family member of John, the victim in the scenario.  Please read 
the statements below, thinking about what things you considered when you were deciding whether 
justice was achieved.  Then, circle the number that best reflects how you made your decisions. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.  I considered the physical suffering John experienced. 
 
Strongly agree       Agree        Slightly agree       Neither agree     Slightly disagree     Disagree        Strongly disagree 
                                                                               nor disagree 
           1                    2                       3                            4                          5                        6                           7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
2.  I considered whether the consequences to the offender were adequate. 
Strongly agree       Agree        Slightly agree       Neither agree     Slightly disagree     Disagree        Strongly disagree 
                                                                               nor disagree 
           1                    2                       3                            4                          5                        6                           7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.  I considered whether John’s views were heard by the legal system. 
Strongly agree       Agree        Slightly agree       Neither agree     Slightly disagree     Disagree        Strongly disagree 
                                                                               nor disagree 
           1                    2                       3                            4                          5                        6                           7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
4.  I considered the psychological suffering John experienced. 
 
Strongly agree       Agree        Slightly agree       Neither agree     Slightly disagree     Disagree        Strongly disagree 
                                                                               nor disagree 
           1                    2                       3                            4                          5                        6                           7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
5.  I considered whether the legal system sufficiently acknowledged the offender’s culpability. 
 
Strongly agree       Agree        Slightly agree       Neither agree     Slightly disagree     Disagree        Strongly disagree 
                                                                               nor disagree 
           1                    2                       3                            4                          5                        6                           7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
6.  I considered the degree to which what happened to the offender made up for his actions towards John. 
 
Strongly agree       Agree        Slightly agree       Neither agree     Slightly disagree     Disagree        Strongly disagree 
                                                                               nor disagree 
           1                    2                       3                            4                          5                        6                           7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
7.  I considered the degree to which the offender was responsible for John’s suffering.  
 
Strongly agree       Agree        Slightly agree       Neither agree     Slightly disagree     Disagree        Strongly disagree 
                                                                               nor disagree 
           1                    2                       3                            4                          5                        6                           7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
